Euxeinos. Governance and Culture in the Black Sea Region by Scheide, Carmen & Schmid, Ulrich
Online Journal of the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe  
University of St. Gallen
URL: www.gce.unisg.ch, www.euxeinos.ch 
ISSN 2296-0708
 
Guest Editors 
Carmen Scheide, Ulrich Schmid (St.Gallen)  
The EuroMaidan in Ukraine
November 2013 till February 2014
Center for Governance and 
Culture in Europe
 
University of St.Gallen
 
LaNdIS & GyR
StIftUNG
      13 / 2014
Last Update 17 March 2014
Kiev 2014 © Sergiy Glasgo 
2Euxeinos 13 (2014)
Contents
 
the EuroMaidan in Ukraine, November 2013 till february 2014
Editorial by Carmen Scheide and Ulrich Schmid, St.Gallen
Maidan 2013 in Kiev: Revolution in People’s Heads   
by Kyril Savin, Kiev
EuroMaidan: Context and Meanings 
by Andriy Portnov, Berlin 
EuroMaidan in dnipropetrovsk: Problems and Peculiarities
by Victoria Narizhna
EuroMaidan in Lviv: a View from the Inside
by Pavlo Ostrovs‘kyj, Lviv
Laws are for “Suckers”, not for “Big Shots”
by Larysa Denysenko, Kiev 
the Writers and the Maidan
by Alexander Kratochvil, Prague 
Crimean Passions around EuroMaidan: an active Pro-European Minority 
of Crimeans against the autonomous Republic’s Pro-Eurasian authorities 
and an ambivalent Majority
by Andrij Ivanec‘
the Blood for yanukovych
by Oksana Syroyid
EuroMaidan. Chronology of Events
by Alexander Kratochvil and Carmen Scheide
Publishing Information/Contact 
3
5
9
15
20
26
32
37
46
52
56
3Euxeinos 13 (2014)
The EuroMaidan in Ukraine 
November 2013 till February 2014
Ed
ito
ri
al
the events in Ukraine have unfolded very rapidly over the past few months. Initially, 
it looked as if President yanukovych could sit 
out the crisis. However, after new laws against 
the Maidan activists were passed on January 
16th, 2014, a further radicalization and politi-
cization took place, which led to the dramatic 
clashes between the government and demon-
strators on the Maidan between february 18th 
and 20th, 2014. the situation fundamentally 
changed with the unexpected increase in vio-
lence and brutality on the EuroMaidan. the 
tragic loss of human life made it immediately 
clear that yanukovych not only was fully dis-
credited as head of state, but also that he was 
not capable of guaranteeing peace and order 
in the Ukrainian capital. 
yanukovych’s escape from Kiev provided 
an occasion for Moscow to brazenly intervene 
into Ukrainian politics. With great media atten-
tion, Putin had the highly compliant federa-
tion Council authorize him to deploy the army 
outside the territory of the Russian federation. 
Since then the Kremlin has been following a 
blunt legalistic line of argument: yanukovych 
was democratically elected by the people in 
2010. an impeachment procedure, as provid-
ed for in article 111 of the Ukrainian Consti-
tution, did not take place. the EuroMaidan 
demonstrators are collectively defamed as fas-
cists and Moscow speaks of a “brown revolu-
tion” against the legitimate government. One 
of the most important problems is the future 
of Crimea. already after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Crimea wanted to separate from 
Ukraine. the status quo – Crimea is an autono-
mous republic in the unitary nation of Ukraine 
– seems to be no longer acceptable for many 
ethnic Russians on the Crimean Peninsula.
 
another complicating factor is Russia’s 
imperial claim to this part of the country, 
which only was incorporated into Ukraine in 
1954. the mood is very tense due to the stead-
fast agitations and provocations of the Putin 
government. the western media have paint-
ed a rather one-sided picture of the events in 
Ukraine: here the evil dictator, there the pro-
testing civil society. However, two things are 
being crossed here: first, Yanukovych could 
have brutally dispersed the EuroMaidan, as 
there were indeed such plans. He did not do 
this. There are also significant doubts wheth-
er he ordered the use of snipers. Second, the 
right-wing block was given intense media at-
tention, which did not correspond at all with 
its share of voters. Most house occupations 
and street battles were carried out by right-
wing radicals. It will be difficult for the in-
terim government to impose democratically 
defined constraints on their claims to power. 
One positive result of the EuroMaidan is 
surely the political involvement of broad seg-
ments of society. Unlike in Russia, where the 
protests of 2011 and 2012 tapered off, there is 
an increased sensitivity to political decision-
making processes in Ukraine today. the me-
dia landscape has also become more diverse 
as a result of the events. above all, online 
media have significantly grown: the reach of 
the internet newspaper “Ukrainska Pravda” 
promptly increased with the protests, while 
independent internet television stations such 
as espreso.tv or hromadske.tv now also have a 
large regular viewership. 
Unlike many Russians, who are indif-
ferent towards politics, many Ukrainians are 
now highly involved in the affairs of their Re-
public and their collective struggle. 
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the present issue of Euxeinos was 
planned for december 2013, while the mass 
protests in Ukraine continued, but no solu-
tion had emerged yet. Instead, the events have 
taken a tragic turn. Up to now, there have been 
98 fatalities, a change in government, and new 
elections will take place on May 25th. Simulta-
neously, the country faces diverse challenges 
as well as political and economic reforms. 
therefore, several texts in this issue have 
been partially “outrun” by the current events. 
Nevertheless, they convey interesting internal 
insights and analyses and can also be seen as 
a chronicle of the events in the present form. 
Since 2011, the Center for Governance 
and Culture in Europe of the University of St. 
Gallen has been linked to a project on Ukraine, 
which analyzes interdependencies between 
regions, nations and cultures and assumes 
that Ukraine is not only divided in two, rather 
that different regional characteristics overlap 
each other and that they are constitutive for 
self-identity processes (http://regionandcul-
ture.krytyka.com/)
among the project members was the 
sociologist Bohdan Solchanyk. 
He was killed by a shot to the head on the 
Maidan on 20 february 2014. 
He was 28 years old. 
On behalf of all project members, this edition 
is dedicated to his memory. 
Carmen Scheide, Ulrich Schmid
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by Kyryl Savin, Kiev
30 December 2013 
Maidan 2013 in Kiev: Revolution in People’s Heads 
the banner of a young woman protest-ing on Independence Square in Kiev said 
“Maidan1 is the best thing that could happen to 
my country”. the Maidan has indeed become 
an island of freedom in the Ukrainian capital, 
where thousands of free-thinkers gather and 
where every Sunday at noon several hundred 
thousand people meet to demonstrate their de-
sire for fundamental changes in Ukraine. al-
though the people’s will to live in a European, 
democratic and free country is strong, all le-
gal means of pressure on the government and 
President yanukovych have already been ex-
hausted and the protests have reached a deep 
political dead-end. this is what explains the 
profoundness of the political crisis in Ukraine. 
the whole story began on November 21st, 
2013 when it was announced that the phase 
of EU integration of Ukraine would be put on 
hold. this decision by the President meant that 
1  Independence Square (in Ukrainian 
– Maidan Nezalezhnosti, often called just Maid-
an) is the largest square in the center of Kiev. 
the association agreement with the EU was 
not signed at the Vilnius Summit and that the 
dream of many, in particular young Ukraini-
ans, to live one day in a European country had 
been taken away. therefore, hundreds of civil 
society actors (as well as journalists, students, 
etc.) gathered on the evening of November 
21st on Maidan Square and organized a small 
stage, which functioned as the focal point of 
the protests 24 hours a day. the stage and the 
logistics associated with it were funded by do-
nations which were collected in large numbers 
on the square. On November 24th, the first 
large-scale demonstration occurred in Kiev. 
Attended by approx. 150,000 people, the motto 
of the event was “the association agreement 
with the EU must be signed in Vilnius”. 
Oppositional politicians set up their stage 
on the neighboring square (the Europe Square, 
located approx. 300 meters from Independence 
Square) on November 24th. Until November 
27th there were two stages – one on Maidan 
Square where students and civil society ac-
tivists gathered and one on Europe Square, 
which primarily served as a focal point for 
party supporters. However, more and more 
people came to the stage on Maidan Square, 
which is why the oppositional politicians gave 
up their stage. this resulted in strong frictions 
between oppositional politicians and civil so-
ciety activists on the Maidan, which became 
increasingly visible. 
In the night between November 29th and 
30th, Independence Square was cleared by the 
police with brutal force – allegedly so that the 
Kiev municipal services could put up a large 
Christmas tree. these evacuation measures 
Kiev November 2013 © Carmen Scheide
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were absolutely irrational, as the “small stu-
dent Maidan” was already more or less over 
after yanukovych did not sign anything in 
Vilnius. According to unofficial information, 
yanukovych returned from Vilnius in a very 
bad mood, because several EU heads of state 
reportedly demeaned him. yanukovych is 
said to be very sensitive. Perhaps he took ac-
tion against the demonstrators on the evening 
of November 29th to vent his aggression after 
the events in Vilnius. according to the journal-
ists Sergii Leshchenko and Mustafa Nayyem2 
he gave the command to completely evacuate 
the Maidan, that is to take action against the 
remaining people there. 
On November 30th many citizens of Kiev 
showed their unrestrained solidarity with the 
students who had been beaten on the Maid-
an the night before. approximately 700,000 
outraged citizens attended the large demon-
stration on Sunday, December 1st. Its motto 
was: “do not beat our children!” Protesters 
occupied the city hall and union headquar-
ters. three oppositional parties assumed the 
leadership role and organization of the logis-
tic measures for the demonstration: UdaR, 
Batkivshtchyna and Svoboda). Over 10,000 
protesters coopered up in tents and occupied 
houses. Material and monetary donations 
helped to set up a kitchen, in which hundreds 
of volunteers worked to serve more than ap-
prox. 400,000 portions of food daily. Calls for 
donations were posted on numerous facebook 
pages, while donation boxes were set up in 
several places on the Maidan. 
On Sunday, december 8th another large-
scale demonstration with approx. 400,000 
protesters took place on the Maidan based 
on the motto “Presidential and parliamentary 
2  http://www.pravda.com.ua/
articles/2013/12/8/7005339/
elections must be held!”3 By then, their aims 
had changed though. It was no longer about 
the European integration of Ukraine, rather 
domestic policy demands: the protesters de-
manded that those responsible for the evacua-
tion measures on November 30th, 2013 should 
be named and brought to justice. furthermore, 
they called for presidential and parliamentary 
elections to be re-held. during the night be-
tween december 10th and 11th, yanukovych 
again attempted to clear up the Maidan by 
force of the police and to free the occupied ad-
ministrative buildings. However, he failed in 
doing so due to the unprecedented resistance 
of the protesters. On december 15th, decem-
ber 27th, and after the act of revenge against 
the journalist and activist tetyana Chernovol 
on december 29th large-scale demonstrations 
again took place in Kiev for which hundreds 
of thousands of Ukrainians gathered. 
Citizens from nearly all social strata took 
part in the protests in Kiev and other large 
Ukrainian cities (several thousand people 
even took to the streets in donetsk and Lu-
gansk). yet the middle class doubtlessly con-
stituted the main driver of the “revolution in 
people’s heads”. In Kiev thousands of repre-
sentatives of the so-called “new creative mid-
dle class” joined the activities. they included 
artists, NGO activists, business people from 
small and mid-sized firm, students, journal-
ists, etc. and provided inspiration for many 
creative slogans and activities on the Maidan. 
they consisted mainly of well-educated peo-
ple, who had been abroad (in EU-countries) 
and now were able and willing to assume re-
sponsibility and no longer can bear living in 
3  There are very different estimations of 
the numbers of participants. the author of this 
article uses average figures based on estimations in 
local articles and reports. 
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contemporary Ukraine without a prospect of 
EU membership for their children. “We want 
the walls that separate us from the modern 
world to fall down”, stated the former politi-
cal prisoner and Maidan activist yuri Luzenko 
recently. 
the wish of the Ukrainians to move closer 
to the EU was only one motive for the protests 
(surveys in October-November 2013 showed 
that over 60% of all Ukrainians were in favor 
of an association with the EU). for several 
months, yanukovych and his government car-
ried out an information and propaganda cam-
paign for a closer association with the EU in 
Ukraine. a week before the Vilnius Summit 
in November 2013 a 180-degree reversal took 
place, which even some of the parliamentary 
deputies from the Party of Regions (Ukr. Par-
tiya Regioniv) could not comprehend. Howev-
er, after the protests on November 30th it was 
no longer about the EU, rather about changes 
to the system within Ukraine itself. 
fundamental democratic transformations 
in Ukraine are long overdue – essentially since 
1991. after gaining independence no funda-
mental transformation and de-Sovietization 
processes took place, which could have as-
sured the long-term democratic development 
of the country. Instead, the elite at that time 
quickly turned into “democrats” and contin-
ued to control the government of Ukraine. the 
oligarchs are the (financial) backbone of all 
Ukrainian presidents. the Ukrainian political 
elite (both the governmental as well as the op-
positional camp) imitates democratic process-
es (including elections) and has succeeded in 
creating a credible democratic façade towards 
the West. yet Ukrainian democracy today re-
mains just a façade. 
an increasing number of citizens of 
Ukraine have come to understand that they do 
not need a fake or imitated democracy, rather 
an authentic democracy, the rule of law, and 
a market economy. the events on the Maid-
an 2013 showed that there is a broader wish 
among the Ukrainian people for fundamental 
changes to the political system – and not just 
for the replacement of political actors. thus, 
the protests of November 2013 indeed consti-
tute a “revolution in people’s heads”. Memo-
ries of the Orange Revolution of 2004 play an 
important role in this process, as many Ukrai-
nians had a positive experience with mass 
protests for the first tine nine years ago. Now 
it has become clear to many protesters that 
the mistake made in 2004 was that the pro-
test activities overly focused on yushchenko 
as a person and not on changes to the system. 
the Ukrainians learned from their own nega-
tive experience that civil society must monitor 
both opposition politicians as well as govern-
ing politicians. 
When the Maidan protesters expressed 
their demands for a closer association and 
integration with the EU, their movement re-
ceived great support in all parts of the coun-
try. However, when they began calling for the 
overdue fundamental democratic transforma-
tion of the country and new elections after 
November 30th, divisions in the public opin-
ion in Ukraine immediately became apparent. 
South-eastern regions quickly remembered 
their “us and them” instincts (Unserer-frem-
der) and tacitly threw their support at the 
relatively unpopular President yanukovych 
and his chief of staff Asarov, who were at least 
“two of their own.” 
the “Russian brothers” from the Kremlin 
are also happy to feed fuel to the Ukrainian 
fire time and time again. The Euro-Maidan 
2013 indeed sheds light on two important di-
mensions: in addition to the above described 
domestic political dimension, there is also an 
important foreign policy – or more precisely 
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– geopolitical dimension. In 2013 Ukraine be-
came the battlefield in the cold war between 
the West and Russia and (thanks to his clever 
tactics) Putin can celebrate yet another geopo-
litical victory after previous successes in Geor-
gia, armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kirgiz-
stan. Yanukovych weighed both offers (from 
Russia and the EU) and decided that depen-
dence on Russia is a lesser evil. after all, he is 
primarily concerned with maintaining power 
and his victory in the presidential elections of 
2015. the price that yanukovych would have 
to pay for this played almost no role at all. 
the Euro-Maidan 2013 will most likely re-
main without any visible political success: as a 
democratically elected president, yanukovych 
is clearly trying to buy time and is consistent-
ly ignoring all demands of the protesters. He 
also by no means wishes to make any obvious 
staffing changes to his cabinet under pressure 
from the protests. Like the seemingly unsuc-
cessful 2000-2001 protest movement “Ukraine 
without Kuchma”, the Euro-Maidan 2013 will 
however impact further domestic political de-
velopments in Ukraine in the long-term. after 
all, a revolution in people’s heads is taking 
place to the extent that they now know what 
they want, are no longer fearful, and by and 
large have almost nothing more to lose. 
It is paradoxical: the 2004 Maidan and the 
successful Orange Revolution (yushchenko 
became the President of Ukraine) will prob-
ably be of lesser importance to the history of 
Ukraine than the currently unsuccessful Euro-
Maidan 2013, because an active Ukrainian civil 
society has emerged during these cold No-
vember and december days on Kiev’s Maidan 
Square. the next heightening of domestic and 
geopolitical tensions in Ukraine is already pro-
grammed – the presidential elections in spring 
2015. Until then, the Ukrainian civil society, 
opposition as well as the EU will have to de-
velop clear strategies. after all, yanukovych 
cannot afford to lose the 2015 election, as he 
and his political companions will lose every-
thing and likely have to go to prison if he is 
defeated and has to turn over power. 
translated by Michael dobbins
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Current events in Ukraine, which have al-ready received the metaphorical tag of 
“Eurorevolution”, have caught everyone off 
guard: the Ukrainian authorities, the opposi-
tion, the European Union, the Russian federa-
tion. this multifarious and dynamic situation 
surprised many observers with a realization 
that a sizeable part of the country’s population 
is formulating a demand for a new (“Europe-
an”) political and social lifestyle. In the given 
text I try to reconstruct the chronology of some 
main events and propose their contextual in-
terpretation. 
The very first part of the protest took place 
during the night of thursday 21 November 
2013 on the Independence Square (known as 
the Maidan) in Kyiv. It took shape as a reac-
tion against the refusal of the authorities to 
sign the Ukraine-EU association agreement 
at the Vilnius Summit of the Eastern Partner-
ship. On Saturday 23 November, for the first 
time since the Orange Revolution, Kyiv saw 
a large gathering of up to 100 000 demonstra-
tors under the slogan of European integration. 
I would say that a significant part (if not the 
outright majority) of those protesting in the 
capital that day were reacting not to the gov-
ernment’s declaration of putting the negotia-
tions with the European Union on hold per se, 
but rather to the style and form of the way 
it was announced*. Citizens were informed 
about this decision post-factum, without any 
sort of open discussion, even though on the 
previous day the authorities assured everyone 
that the association agreement will certainly 
be signed in Vilnius. 
those who congregated on the Maidan 
that night were not political activists, and they 
EuroMaidan: Context and Meanings
by andriy Portnov, Berlin
10 January 2014 
had no political leaders. Rather, it was a spon-
taneous assembly of indignant social network 
users, which gathered a few hundred people 
at most. Initially, thousands of participants of 
Saturday meetings, as well as of similar Eu-
roMaidan gatherings across Ukraine, empha-
sized that their demand is the signing of the 
EU association agreement, and that they are 
not aligned with any political power what-
soever.
It would seem that the demonstration’s 
depoliticization might have launched its in-
evitable marginalization. But at 4 a.m. on 
Saturday 30 November, something appalling 
took place on the Maidan. Under the pretence 
of having to prepare the square for the tra-
ditional New year’s tree, special police force 
“Berkut” brutally attacked the students who 
were camping there. Outraged by this devel-
opment, hundreds of thousands of people 
poured into the streets of Kyiv on Saturday. 
thus, the protest turned not only political, 
but also plainly anti-governmental: idealistic 
calls for Euro-integration were accompanied 
now with demands for resignation of both the 
President and the Prime Minister. 
the leaders of the three oppositional par-
liamentary factions (arseniy yatseniuk from 
yulia tymoshenko`s “Bat`kivschyna”, Vitaliy 
Klychko from “Udar”, and Oleh tiahnybok 
from far-right “Svoboda”), now officially 
heading this protest, were totally unprepared 
for its scope. they were also not prepared 
to deal with provocations that aimed to por-
tray scenes of violence and frighten observ-
ers, particularly external ones. the epicentre 
of such provocations was the storming of the 
Presidential administration using a building 
* author’s emphasis 
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excavator, the subsequent beating by police of 
all who were nearby, and the arrest of about 
ten random passers-by on the charge of public 
incitement to violence. In practice, this lead to 
unprecedented mass protests in Kyiv. demon-
strators occupied several municipal buildings 
(including the City Council headquarters) 
and returned to the Maidan. this time, they 
brought tents, barricades, and a stage.
On tuesday 3 december the Verkhovna 
Rada did not gather enough votes to force the 
government’s resignation. Neither the author-
ities nor the opposition, it seems, took note of 
advice offered by Victoria Nulland (the Assis-
tant Secretary of State for European and Eur-
asian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State) 
and Catherine ashton (High Representative 
of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy). they called for a proper roundtable 
and for formation of a coalition government, 
which could assume a full responsibility for 
the unavoidably painful economic reforms. 
during the visit of these VIP guests, on the 
night from tuesday to Wednesday 10 de-
cember, police forces in Kyiv attempted to 
dislodge the demonstrators, and dismantled 
some of their barricades. this was streamed 
live online. Within a few hours, thousands 
of Kyiv residents gathered on the Maidan. 
By dawn, the police backed off. The Maidan 
was elated. and the protest, now fully and 
irreversibly, surpassed the reaction to Euro-
integration hindrances, and turned into op-
position to the current political regime. the 
government, meanwhile, approached all calls 
for political roundtables not as a potential way 
out of this crisis, but rather as a decorative ar-
rangement for the West (even though on 13 
december both President Victor yanukovych 
and the leaders of the opposition participated 
in one such roundtable).
to sum up, in the words of Evgeniy 
Kiselev, over the past month the authorities 
“made obviously wrong decisions with en-
viable consistency, and every such decision 
lifted the task of solving the crisis onto a new 
level of difficulty” [1]. Meanwhile, the end 
of december made clear that the Maidan is 
a problem for the opposition as well as for 
the government.  the former, the opposition, 
keeps trying to tame the Maidan, which un-
doubtedly surpasses the level and scope of its 
political outlook. And the latter, the govern-
ment, attempted to counter the Maidan with a 
big concert in support of the acting president 
on Saturday 14 december. at this event, Prime 
Minister Nikolai azarov spooked the audi-
ence with declarations that the EU demands 
of Ukraine include legalization of same-sex 
marriage. 
By arranging this anti-Maidan, the au-
thorities wanted to show that the crisis is not 
about people opposing the government; it’s 
about one part of Ukraine opposing another 
part. Manipulations with this faulty notion 
was made simpler by the fact that existent 
distrust of the government in the East and 
South of the country does not find a reflec-
tion in these regions’ electoral preferences. 
this is due to the fact these regions, in general, 
do not view the country’s “national-democrat-
ic” political factions as capable of represent-
ing them, and the ruling Party of Regions can 
exploit votes to stop “the nationalists” from 
coming to power [2]. Indeed, in Ukraine, there 
is currently no democratic force committed to 
working consistently with the primarily Rus-
sophone electorate in the East and South of the 
country.
But in no way does this situation mean 
that, on socio-cultural and political levels, 
geographically defined “two Ukraines” actu-
ally exist, one of which allegedly dreams of 
nothing but a “reunion” with Russia, while 
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the other is busy only with merging its pro-
European notions with a cult of a nationalist 
hero Stepan Bandera. Regularly replayed in 
both English- and Russian-language publica-
tions around the world, the defective theory 
about the non-existence of Ukraine as a cul-
tural entity – complete with prompts for a 
“peaceful divorce” of its two parts [3] – mis-
takenly describes contemporary Ukraine as an 
analogue of Czechoslovakia, where the Slovak 
part can split, in a “velvet” manner, from the 
Czech part. In reality, the curious phenom-
enon of existing diverse interpretations and 
definitions of “Ukrainian-ness” in the con-
text of post-Soviet political realities – as well 
as co-existence and competitiveness of these 
different understandings – supports Rory Fin-
nin’s important observation that “the thesis of 
Ukraine’s ‘weak’ national identity is not only 
conceptually vague but analytically useless” 
[4]. It is evidence of the potential of a search 
for new concepts and new terminology that 
could describe Ukraine’s social reality.
On Sunday 15 december, in advance of 
the million-strong people’s gathering against 
Ukraine’s joining the Customs Union of Belar-
us, Kazakhstan, and Russia, many worried that 
“a clash of the two Ukraines” will be staged 
there. But the publicized meeting of the Party 
of Regions was cancelled. as for the gathering 
in support of the authorities, it was declared 
“indefinite”, and after a few days those camp-
ing near the Verkhovna Rada were sent home. 
Most observers agreed that the government 
adopted the tactic of ignoring the Maidan in 
hopes for its self-marginalization. 
   On tuesday 17 december, President ya-
nukovych left for a business trip to Moscow. 
as a result of his visit, Ukraine was promised 
a credit of 15 billion dollars, as well as a lower-
ing of the cost of gas from around 400 to 268.5 
dollars per thousand cubic meters. President 
Putin announced that this help for his “frater-
nal” country came “without any kind of condi-
tions”. Kyiv’s courtier journalist commented: 
“Who prevented the central banking institu-
tion of the European Union – European Bank 
for Reconstruction and development – from 
purchasing Ukrainian bonds, say, for 15 bil-
lion euro? they’ve got no money for Ukraine? 
too bad. turns out Russia does have money 
for Ukraine” [5]. But soon it became clear 
that Moscow’s gifts were far from altruistic. 
they are not without an expiration date (for 
instance, the gas discount will be reviewed 
every quarter) and they are directly linked to 
Ukraine’s “proper” behaviour [6]. No official 
admission into the Customs Union was men-
tioned, which allowed less far-sighted observ-
ers to overlook the Kremlin’s bid for a new 
model of integration, consisting of owning 
and controlling strategic areas of Ukraine’s 
economy. (the new framework will be built 
on interlocking, inter-sectorial integration – in 
other words, on Russia’s co-ownership and 
co-management of the key sectors of Ukraine’s 
economy. [7]). 
Russian money gave President yanu-
kovych some time to stitch up the most appar-
ent holes in Ukraine’s budget. But it did not 
solve the structural problems of the country’s 
economy – direct results of multiple errors 
by the current and previous governments. 
It’s worth noting that Ukraine stood on the 
verge of bankruptcy not due to the threat of 
signing the EU agreement, but due to the gov-
ernment’s extensive leaning on the economy, 
as well as an unfavourable business climate, 
widespread corruption, and irresponsible 
populism of the ruling elites [8].
this short-term ability to save the status-
quo through capitulating (an important in-
gredient of which, it seems, will be Ukraine’s 
loss of control over the gas transport system) 
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was positioned by azarov’s government as a 
big economic success. President Putin looked 
far more convincing in his role as a winner, 
having acquired another trophy following 
Snowden and Syria. But the biggest illusion 
of Kremlin seems to be a deep believe that, in 
general terms, Ukrainians and Russians are 
“one people” [9]. This stereotype automati-
cally blocks official Moscow`s ability to ade-
quately access both the Maidan events and the 
social disposition in Ukraine in general.
at the same time, the diplomats of most 
countries of the European Union (it is diffi-
cult to speak about a thoughtful and coordi-
nated EU foreign policy) either truly do not 
understand, or not want to understand, the 
Kremlin’s reasoning as far as the Ukrainian 
question is concerned. the European negotia-
tors did not quite comprehend President ya-
nukovych’s position when they kept talking to 
him about freeing yulia tymoshenko1, instead 
of addressing his expected topics of finan-
cial assistance and guarantees of re-election 
in 2015. Neither did they grasp the depth of 
the Kremlin’s interest in disrupting Ukraine’s 
signing of the EU association agreement. as 
James Sherr astutely notes, for Brussels the 
association agreement was an alternative for 
Ukraine`s EU membership, but for Moscow it 
was the EU enlargement by other means [10]. 
during the traditional crowded Sun-
day Maidan gathering on 22 december 2013, 
the leaders of opposition took the stage and 
announced the creation of an NGO called 
“People`s Union Maidan”. this amorphous 
body, brought forth without any open discus-
sion, quickly raised questions and suspicions. 
first of all, it was presumed that the opposi-
tion is trying to look busy despite its lack of 
strategy or decisiveness. the opposition was 
1 yulia tymoshenko was released 22 february, 
2014
also suspected of trying to head something it 
did not actually create, and which surpasses 
it intellectually. as yuriy Ruban accurately 
commented, the Maidan is looking for an-
swers to a problem which will not be solved 
by any of the opposition leaders’ victory in 
presidential elections [11]. In other words, the 
Maidan is trying to formulate the need for a 
programme of reforms, which not does exist, 
as well as the need for a new socio-political 
force, which also does not exist yet. 
So what exactly is the Maidan? How can 
we explain the phenomenon of its self-orga-
nization? Which historical metaphors can de-
scribe its nature? Possibly the most popular, 
though far from incontestable, is the metaphor 
of the Zaporizhian Sich. It refers to the early 
modern political phenomenon of Cossack self-
government, ended by Russia’s absolutism at 
the end of the 18th century [12]. While most 
visitors live in tents set up in the centre of 
Kyiv, the crowded weekly Sunday gatherings 
are comprised of educated, enterprising and 
well-off middle-aged people who weave their 
hopes for change into a loosely-defined notion 
of Europeanization (I will return to this topic 
shortly). the Maidan, then, can be described 
as a temporary space of non-conflicting coop-
eration and coexistence of people from very 
different social circles. I think most of these 
individuals are united by their denunciation 
not only of the ruling authorities, but also of 
Ukraine’s post-Soviet political and economic 
situation in general. any positive aspects of 
this alliance are vaguer and less rationalized: 
they merges elements of nationalism with the 
mythology of Europe. 
as far as nationalism is concerned, the 
Maidan has already legitimized nationalist 
slogans (such as “Glory to Ukraine – Glory to 
the Heroes!” [Slava Ukrajini – Herojam sla-
va!]) and flags (such as the black-and-red flag 
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of the nationalist underground of World War 
II) as symbols of a pro-European protest [13]. 
The black-and-red flag was raised in place of 
the monument to Lenin, which was destroyed 
in the evening of december 8 near the Besar-
absky Market. the far-right party “Svoboda” 
proudly claimed responsibility for this; at the 
same time, it curbed its usual anti-immigrant 
and homophobic rhetoric. as for “Glory to 
Ukraine!”, I think we can discuss not only its 
legitimization, but also the transformation of 
meaning it underwent on the Maidan. this can 
be illustrated by the speech given on the Maid-
an by the leader of the Polish conservative 
party “Law and Justice” Jaroslaw Kaczynski, 
which ended with “Glory to Ukraine!”, lead-
ing to a number of discussions in Polish right 
periodicals. While one writer saw it as the Pol-
ish politician’s “resurrection of Galician fas-
cism”, historian and essayist andrzej Nowak 
wrote that at this time, “Glory to Ukraine!” 
has become analogous to the slogan “Long live 
to Poland!” (Niech żyje Polska!) which has a 
broad patriotic sense [14].
as for Maidan’s pro-European rhetoric, 
it is based on the mythology of Europe as a 
space of the rule of law, social justice, free-
dom of movement and expression, which was 
widespread in countries of the former Warsaw 
Pact and the Baltic nations prior to their join-
ing the EU. this mythology of Europe far sur-
passes not only the content of the failed associ-
ation agreement, but also the actual condition 
of the European Union. It does not correspond 
to the realities of today’s Europe. But I would 
suggest that it is equally important to discuss 
the authenticity of such ideas themselves, as 
well as their ability to mobilize the most ac-
tive portion of the population. Considering the 
European Union’s lack of keenness for further 
enlargement into the post-Soviet area, we have 
the problem of “Europe beyond Europe” as a 
new challenge for international politics. In 
this context, Ukraine’s ability to avoid mass 
violence while solving political conflicts is 
absolutely vital.  the country’s post-Soviet 
history saw no parliamentary executions, no 
use of firearms against demonstrators, no po-
groms. Both the society and the political elites 
so far have shown their resistance to violent 
scenarios, leaning towards finding peaceful 
solutions to all crises.
during the night of the Catholic Christ-
mas, journalist tetiana Chornovol was as-
saulted in the vicinity of Kyiv. Once again, 
Ukraine was pushed to escalate the conflict. 
It was shoved towards the use of force, lead-
ing to further isolation of the current govern-
ment from the West. this mosaic, made up of 
slightly disoriented but still confident authori-
ties, weak opposition, a self-assured Kremlin, 
a newborn civil society that has no adequate 
parliamentary representation, and an eternal-
ly confused and tardy European Union, can 
develop in most (un)expected ways. Only one 
thing is clear: Ukraine’s economic and political 
crisis is not solved. and the story continues…
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EuroMaidan in Dnipropetrovsk: Problems and Peculiarities
by Victoria Narizhna
22 January 2014
dnipropetrovsk is not Ukraine’s first city, but neither is a second. this old-time joke 
is often applied to describe various Ukrainian 
cities, as it was indeed in relation to many a So-
viet city in the past. dnipropetrovsk, however, 
may be in the position to assert its primacy as 
the subject of the joke, since in its particular 
case there is more than a fair share of truth in 
it. Back in Soviet times the city was hailed as 
the “forge of cadres” which remains relatively 
true to this day: like in the past it produced 
elite party cadres for the Soviet Union, today’s 
dnipropetrovsk has given to the independent 
Ukraine many of its oligarchs and well-known 
politicians. the “fame” remains, despite the 
fact that members of Ukraine’s current politi-
cal leadership come from the “donetsk clan” 
and dnipropetrovsk’s most famous daughter 
yulia tymoshenko - not extremely popular at 
home anyway - is in jail. 
a joke or not - it looks like dnipropetro-
vsk residents have seriously accepted this as 
their identity background. to a large extent, 
the specificity of protest movement in the city 
can be explained by its self-identified “other-
ness” and “differentness”. A common argu-
ment holds it that a low protest participation 
rate in dnipropetrovsk is determined by the 
region’s pro-Russian sentiment and its sup-
port for incumbent authorities. It is, in my 
mind, a simplistic explanation. 
dnipropetrovsk’s inherent tendency 
is to keep a distanced position in any so-
cial and political processes. this is a feature 
typical of all local community - from rank-
and-file citizens to power structures. In a 
month of recent protests in dnipropetrovsk, 
the city has not seen a single clash between 
the protesters and the police, which demon-
strated a commendably tolerant approach. 
The only violent conflict was an attack on 
the “tent camp” - a somewhat strong descrip-
tion of the two tents in European Square - car-
ried out not by the riot-police as in Kiev but 
by the so-called “titushkas”, groups of young 
sporty men who are hired to do dirty jobs for 
pay. Even this episode, however, stirred a 
wave of indignation among dnipropetrovsk 
residents who saw it as the violation of a tacit 
agreement between the authorities and the 
city community (most city inhabitants believe 
that the attack was ordered by certain local bu-
reaucrats to showcase their loyalty to central 
authorities). Moreover, the incident was even 
seen as violating the tradition of the city’s dis-
engagement, an attack on its common sense 
that has always underpinned local authori-
ties’ waiting position allowing them to pre-
pare possible ways of retreat and demonstrate 
a measure of readiness for joining a winning 
party. 
Rumours that started to circulate shortly 
after the attack confirm the city population’s 
specific penchant for maintaining the har-
mony. the legend has it that the “titushkas” 
attack was organised by a high-rank official 
at dnipropetrovsk city council. after the in-
cident the official was reportedly promptly 
summoned for an unpleasant discussion at the 
security service (SBU), chided for crossing the 
limits and advised to remedy the situation as 
soon as possible. they say that now the same 
official is responsible for providing financial 
help to dnipropetrovsk’s EuroMaidan.
Regardless of how much truth or tale there 
is in this story, it is a good example of dnipro-
petrovsk’s specificity as seen by its own resi-
dents: the authorities here do not like to quarrel 
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with the citizens and avoid coercive measures. 
this idea can be supported by other ex-
amples of how dnipropetrovsk’s govern-
ment plans of suppressing EuroMaidan were 
thwarted in the city. thus, a court decision 
banning assemblies in some of the city’s pub-
lic places from November 26 to december 31 
2013 (a motion passed by courts in the entire 
Ukraine) was cancelled by the Court of ap-
peals on december 19, after the city council 
withdrew its claim. In their fight against the 
protesters, dnipropetrovsk authorities tend 
to use more nuanced methods: for example, 
by organising a permanent fair in European 
Square, the centre of the city’s EuroMaidan. 
Even those, however, give an impression of a 
nominal, half-felt way of demonstrating their 
loyalty to Kiev. Protesters have free access 
to European Square, while sellers at the fair 
(read: street vendors sent here from elsewhere 
in the city) are always on the standby to pack 
up their wares and give way to a few thou-
sands of protesters. 
the authorities’ talent and prepared-
ness to bring a situation under control has 
been proven in other cases of public protest. 
a strike initiative by the metro construction 
workers and employees of a local electrical 
transportation company quickly died out on 
its own, although it is not entirely clear what 
lay behind - promises and deals with the strike 
committee or the authorities’ skillful pressure 
on the strikers. 
a lack of serious confrontation between 
the community and the elite creates a peace-
ful atmosphere in the city. On the other hand, 
it significantly reduces the residents’ protest 
potential. In dnipropetrovsk, like the rest of 
Ukraine, mass protests against the suspension 
of an EU agreement were galvanised by the 
government’s use of force on the night of No-
vember 30. In other words, there should be a 
real visible conflict to make the reluctant Dni-
propetrovsk residents join street protests. 
EuroMaidan is dnipropetrovsk remains 
a “weekend rally”. Sunday rallies, called Peo-
ple’s Veche by the opposition , gather a few 
thousands participants (the largest, of around 
7 thousand people, was on december 8). the 
rest of the time the city’s tranquil atmosphere 
belies any presence of protest feelings.
a useful comparison can be made here 
with the 2004 protests of the Orange revolu-
tion. although they were not bigger in num-
bers, the protests’ symbolic presence in the city 
was more evident. Orange ribbons on trees, 
flags flying from private and office balconies, 
badges and ribbons on people’s clothes, cars 
decorated with orange symbols - the whole 
city so openly manifested its solidarity with 
the protest that the dry figures of the polling 
stations and their protocols looked like a com-
plete nonsense. Now car drivers are happy to 
greet the protesters’ march - an already tradi-
tional component of all Sunday rallies - with 
their horns, but are less enthusiastic about 
decorating their cars with the protest flags.
What may be the reason behind such pas-
sivity, considering that the residents’ level of 
dissatisfaction with the authorities and their 
response to the recent events is very high? It 
should be admitted that, regretfully, Dnipro-
petrovsk proved unprepared to spontaneous 
civil activity and self-organisation. the 2004 
protest took place under the leadership of 
the concrete political parties and had a well-
defined goal - the annulment of the rigged 
election results and, if possible, the opposition 
candidate’s victory in a new vote. the current 
protest, by contrast, is spontaneous, ambigu-
ous and without a clear vector to the future. 
It requires from its participants a very high 
level of self-awareness and self-organisation. 
Party leaders - at least in dnipropetrovsk - do 
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not support the movement with money or or-
ganisational effort. Although a positive thing 
in many respects, this has clearly proved too 
difficult a challenge for the city residents. 
Perhaps, in spite of their cherished sense 
of individualism and independence, the peo-
ple of dnipropetrovsk still experience a stron-
ger influence of the lingering consequences of 
the totalitarian system than their compatriots 
in Kiev or Lviv. they have a weaker belief 
in their own strength and a bigger hope for 
a “strong leader” and command from above. 
this may help explain why dnipropetrovsk 
felt a deeper frustration after the Orange revo-
lution failed to radically change Ukraine’s so-
ciety and the state. I often hear that - despite 
the general anger against the authorities and 
their policies such as tax increases - represen-
tatives of dnipropetrovsk’s business commu-
nity justify their passivity in the current pro-
test movement by saying: “We have already 
protested once. What dit we get from it?” In-
deed, current level of participation in the pro-
test movement on the part of local small and 
medium-size entrepreneurs is incomparable 
to 2004, when this social category was very ac-
tively involved in the protests.
Oleksandr Blyuminov, a left-leaning blog-
ger, wrote in his entry “Why will Maidan 
win?”: “What is Ukrainian society today? It 
is split. But not in two opposing camps with 
their own goals and values, as we are being 
wrongly convinced by dumb propagandists. 
No, Ukrainian society is split between those 
who have developed a higher sense of subjec-
tive self-awareness and those who have not”. 
this observation does sound reasonable and 
can be equally applied to dnipropetrovsk. 
Recent events have clearly demonstrated that 
individualism of the type “my cottage is at the 
edge” (moia khata skraiu), typical of dnipro-
petrovsk identity, does not amount to subjec-
tivity. to be a subject does not mean to sim-
ply keep one’s distance and care about own’s 
proper interests; it is primarily to learn to take 
responsibility for one’s own life and for the 
world around. this awareness is something 
that the residents of Dnipropetrovsk definitely 
lack; the result, to quote a favourite phrase of 
the independent Ukraine ‘s first president, be-
ing “we have what we have”: we have a high 
degree of anti-government criticism in daily 
life conversations and a low degree of public 
protest.
these factors, in my opinion, to a large ex-
tent determine the current low level of public 
support for the protest movement, despite the 
presence of a high degree of anti-government 
sentiment in dnipropetrovsk society. the city 
is not so much pro-Russian, as it is damaged 
by the legacy of Russian and Soviet power. It 
is less pro-government than it is disillusioned 
and indifferent.
demography of the rallies deserves a 
special attention. The base of any public pro-
test in dnipropetrovsk is usually composed 
of a specific category of people, the so-called 
“Hurrah-patriots” or “professional patri-
ots”. It is essentially a “protest substratum” 
consisting of older people who entered the 
independence period with a significant back-
ground experience of fighting against the sys-
tem. They have carried on their fight for all 
22 years of the independence , in the difficult 
context of the Russian-speaking and - to an 
extent - Soviet-minded dnipropetrovsk. these 
people speak exclusively in Ukrainian, under 
no circumstances switch to the interlocutor’s 
language, profess nationalist views and per-
ceive themselves as inhabitants of a ghetto 
rather than equal citizens. as a result, they are 
hardly able to do anything more than express 
discontent in different ways. This category of 
people is helpless in the conditions of a spon-
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taneous protest, when a community’s creative 
potential and its ability to formulate a strategy 
and identify its goals acquire paramount im-
portance. 
  On the other hand, participation of stu-
dents, young business people and young pro-
fessionals in the protest movement remains 
very low, at least on the local level. It is worth 
noting, however, that it is impossible to assess 
a real level of the protest potential in dniprop-
etrovsk on the basis of the numbers and demo-
graphic composition of the city’s rallies. Lots of 
local residents have left for Kiev’s protests or 
travel their regularly to attend Sunday rallies. 
Obviously, those are mostly young, strong and 
active people. Perhaps, the demographic com-
position of EuroMaidan in dnipropetrovsk is 
also determined by this factor - the departure 
of the youngest and most active protesters for 
the capital.
Moreover, dnipropetrovsk residents are 
weary of the ongoing radicalisation of the 
problem of “two Ukraines”, as a result of the 
events in Kiev. In a moment of crisis, Ukrai-
nians’ perceptions of the civilisational and 
ideological differences between Eastern and 
Western Ukraine become more acute (these 
differences exist although they are less dra-
matic than when presented by the advocates 
of separatism on both sides). for many resi-
dents of Eastern Ukraine, including dniprop-
etrovsk, the protest movement embodies the 
values and meanings of the west of the coun-
try, which they do not share. Hence, their feel-
ing of estrangement. and although EuroMaid-
an brings up many problems acutely painful 
for the whole Ukraine - such as corruption, the 
defacto elimination of independent courts, the 
transformation of police force into the authori-
ties’ personally controlled security services, 
and the economic downfall - these issues do 
not receive nearly enough emphasis to be able 
to unite Ukraine’s East and West in the search 
of a solution and a common movement. By 
contrast, nationalist slogans of the “Svoboda” 
party and its followers, as well as the protest-
ers’ general animosity towards the East as the 
president’s stronghold, sow a feeling of alarm 
among rank-and-file city residents.
In an article “How to make sense of our 
senseless situation”, Ukrainian historian and 
publicist yaroslav Hrytsak argues that to fos-
ter a new Ukrainian nation the already exist-
ing union between Lviv and Kiev has to be 
extended to include a third component, en-
gaging the country’s eastern and southern re-
gions. He writes: “for me personally the most 
suitable candidate for this role is dnipropetro-
vsk - not the first city, but neither a second by 
far”. Regretfully, he only makes a brief men-
tion of this idea, without explaining further 
what makes dnipropetrovsk worth the role.
I, for one, am ready to agree with the idea 
even without an explanation. dnipropetrovsk 
does seem to be a suitable third pillar to pow-
erfully support the fight for a transformation 
of the system. donetsk and Lugansk have been 
subject to the pressure of the pro-government 
oligarchs and the informational blockade for 
far too long to provide such a reliable plat-
form. Besides, the inhabitants of these regions 
have suffered an even more profound damage 
to their subjective self-awareness than their 
compatriots in dnipropetrovsk, aggravated 
by years of the economic crisis. the third pil-
lar, however, is to be chosen from these three 
symbolic cities which are invariably named 
as the supporting base for the incumbent au-
thorities and the pro-Russian or - indeed - pro-
Soviet sentiment.
What is clearly needed now is a sufficient 
motive for dnipropetrovsk residents to cross 
the borderline between individual discontent 
and public protest. Should all the unhappy cit-
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izens make their criticism public, this would 
surely come as a big surprise for the power 
vertical. for now, however, dnipropetrovsk 
remains relatively disengaged from the pro-
test. It is true that the maximum numbers of 
people attending EuroMaidan rallies in the 
city are comparable with other Ukrainian cit-
ies and are much higher than in other regime’s 
“strongholds” such as donetsk or Lugansk. 
It is also evident, however, that under cer-
tain mobilising factors the protest movement 
could grow much stronger.
To achieve this goal, it is in the first place 
necessary to locate dnipropetrovsk’s “launch 
mechanism”. What can compel its citizens to 
start voicing their criticism actively and loudly? 
What can accelerate the evolution of the city’s 
individualism into proper subjectivity? alas, 
for now the questions remain unanswered. 
translated by  Vladyslava Reznyk 
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the EuroMaidan movement began when angry Ukrainians all over the country 
started to protest against the government’s 
decision to abandon the process of Ukraine’s 
European integration. My fellow students and 
I joined a rally at Lviv’s central square on the 
first day of the protest. We could not imagine 
then that the protest movement would reach 
such a scale and that the whole world would 
support the demands and hopes of Ukrainian 
people. 
Maidan for the 
Future
I learned the news 
about the government’s 
U-turn on Ukraine’s EU 
integration from the in-
ternet. My friends and I 
were shocked. It became 
clear that instead of the 
promised EU standards 
Ukrainians could get a 
USSR 2.0. version. We 
had a feeling that we, 
Ukrainian students, had 
been suddenly deprived 
of a decent future; that 
everything had been de-
cided behind our backs. 
We could not stand it 
any longer. On the same evening we gathered 
at our student dorm to discuss how we could 
influence the situation. In some cities people 
were already filling up their central squares to 
show their protest against the government’s 
actions. Without wasting time, we got ready, 
by Pavlo Ostrovs‘kyj, Lviv 
beginning of February 2014
EuroMaidan in Lviv: a View From the Inside
took the flags of Ukraine and the EU and 
made our way to Svoboda avenue. We also 
brought with us a self-made poster “People of 
Kiev – all to the Maidan!” – realizing that main 
events would take place in the capital. On our 
way to Lviv’s Maidan we were inviting our 
friends to join us straightaway (although it 
was kind of late for a rally at 10 p.m.). In two 
hours the number of people grew from 14 to 
200. Some of the active participants came out 
with the idea of a flash-mob – it took us only a 
few minutes to form a huge human circle and 
the letters EU. We realized the importance of 
making the voice of young Ukrainians heard, 
but we could not imagine that we were tak-
ing part in historical events. Our act of civil 
resistance lasted for more than four hours; we 
Maidan in Lviv © Pavlo Ostrovs’kyj
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parted with the decision to meet again the fol-
lowing night.
the second day of the protests was re-
markable for its massive student protest rally 
which gathered thousands of students in front 
of the regional state administration. young 
people moved along the streets of Lviv in huge 
columns chanting “Ukraine is Europe”, “Join 
us!” and “Revolution”. In the evening the first 
mass rally took place in Svoboda avenue. 
Lviv’s mayor andriy Sadovyi called on the city 
residents to take part in the event. Well-known 
public figures took to the stage to express their 
disagreement with the government’s decision 
and to demand the signing of an association 
agreement with the EU. during the rally the 
activists were putting up tents, for the protest 
was announced as an indefinite action. The 
tents were supposed to become a centre of the 
European movement in Lviv. the authorities 
did not approve of the tents and tried to ban 
them through court. But they did not succeed.
Every day the Maidan in Lviv saw be-
tween 10 and 30 thousand participants. at the 
beginning those were mostly young people. 
University administrations allowed their stu-
dents free attendance so that they could partic-
ipate in the protests. to keep the protest-
ers in high spirits, the organizers put up 
a stage and invited to the Maidan singers, 
bands, public figures and other speakers. 
A field kitchen opened near the main tent 
to provide food and drink to everyone.
Why did all those people come out? 
they did it because their dream about a 
decent life in a European Ukraine was 
stolen. they were frustrated by a sudden 
change in the country’s geopolitical course 
and hoped to influence the president into 
signing an association agreement in Vilni-
us. But the 29th of November brought an-
other disappointment – the agreement was 
not signed. and on November the 30th a few 
dozens of students remaining in the Maidan 
in Kiev were violently dispersed by the special 
police unit Berkut. Even those who tried to 
escape were badly beaten. Ukrainian and for-
eign journalists were also among the victims.
A new quality of the Maidan
a violent crackdown on a peaceful pro-
test outraged the Ukrainians – in the evening 
of November the 30th thousands of people 
joined a mass protest rally in Lviv. they 
came to protest against the brutal dispersal 
of the students in Kiev. the Maidan in Lviv 
announced general mobilization – every day 
thousands of people from Lviv left their city 
for Kiev to support the protests in the capi-
tal. One of the tents in Svoboda avenue was 
turned into a headquarters where those who 
cared could bring money, warm clothes and 
food for the protesters in Kiev and Lviv.
From the first days of EuroMaidan like-
minded demonstrators in Kiev started to form 
various interest groups. thus, Maidan’s Civil 
Sector would organize creative actions – they 
worked with the police force persuading them 
© Carmen Scheide
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to take the people’s side and treating them to 
hot tea; they made newspapers and carried 
out public awareness work. the initiative Eu-
roMaidan SOS united human rights defenders 
and all those who wanted to help the victims 
of Berkut’s brutality. Car drivers joined the 
automaidan movement and organized pickets 
near the residences of the most odious govern-
ment officials. There were dozens of similar 
associations in EuroMaidan, who co-existed in 
a relative peace.
Lviv’s Maidan saw the formation of its 
own civil movements. One of those was an 
association for an “Economic boycott of the 
Party of Regions business interests”. the idea 
was to exert economic pressure on the Party 
of Regions deputies. Volunteers of the boycott 
movement would stand outside the shops be-
longing to members of the ruling party and 
distribute flyers with the calls to boycott their 
products. the argument was quite simple – 
every hryvnia paid to the pro-government 
businessmen would be used to strengthen ya-
nukovych’s rule and his authoritarian regime. 
as a result of the numerous pickets and pub-
lic condemnation, the PR fraction in Lviv city 
council and the regional administration volun-
tarily dissolved. the remaining loyalist mem-
bers of the ruling party continue to count losses.
Our struggle was also inspired by the un-
precedented levels of support from the city’s 
business community and ordinary citizens. 
Representatives of local businesses contrib-
uted to organizing bus transportation to Kiev. 
It was also a pleasure to see automobile points 
serving free hot tea and coffee to everyone in 
Lviv’s Maidan. Mobile network operators in 
Svoboda Avenue offered free top-up service, 
while city hostels provided free rooms to the 
activists. Hundreds of city residents brought 
food and warm clothing to protect the protest-
ers in Kiev and Lviv from the cold weather.
No access to politicians
another characteristic of Lviv’s Maidan 
is its wary attitude to politicians. In the first 
days of the protests students would not al-
low politicians on to the Maidan stage. thus, 
a Svoboda deputy yuriy Mykhalchyshyn who 
sneaked to the stage and made a disparaging 
comment about the students who guarded the 
stage from politicians was booed by the crowd. 
this episode is quite remarkable also for the 
fact that Svoboda won the 2012 local elections 
in Lviv and Mykhalchyshyn became a depu-
ty in one of the city constituencies. after the 
crackdown of November the 30th politicians 
were allowed access to the Maidan’s stage, but 
the number of people in the square began to 
fall. The current situation is different from the 
Maidan 2004 when Ukrainians pledged their 
hopes with one politician. Now most people 
understand that ordinary citizens and politi-
cians have different goals and they can rely 
only on themselves and the like-minded com-
rades. thus, one of the main tasks after Euro-
Maidan’s victory would be the creation of the 
efficient mechanisms of public control over 
politicians and government officials. 
A hot time 
In January the numbers of protesters 
in Kiev’s and Lviv’s Maidans grew smaller. 
While the attendance was higher on Sundays, 
on weekdays it largely fell. at this point, how-
ever, the authorities added a generous helping 
of fuel to the protest fire – the Party of Regions 
and communist MPs at the Verkhovna Rada in 
what was a clear violation of Parliament’s vot-
ing procedures passed a number of laws which 
significantly restricted civil rights and were 
primarily directed against the participants of 
mass protests. the manner in which the laws 
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were passed deserves a special attention. Pro-
government MPs voted for themselves and for 
their absent colleagues. although there was 
slightly more than a hundred deputies present 
in the assembly, the electronic voting system 
showed 239 yes-votes, with the 226 needed. 
When the opposition MPs tried to stop the il-
legal voting by removing the electronic cards 
of the missing deputies, parliament’s vice-
speaker Igor Kaletnik proposed a hand vote. 
all present pro-government MPs voted by a 
show of hands and without even bothering 
to count them, Volodymyr Oliynyk, a mem-
ber of the counting committee, announced the 
adoption of the laws by 235 votes. the adopt-
ed laws were even more brutal than the vio-
lations of the parliamentary procedures that 
took place. thus, they introduced criminal li-
ability for libel and extremism. these concepts 
were given such a wide interpretation that any 
potential criticism of the authorities or calls to 
resist the state despotism could lead to serious 
prison sentences. the laws also introduced a 
ban on car processions of more than 5 vehicles 
and a possibility of blocking internet sites by 
state officials. Moreover, all civil society orga-
nizations obtaining grants from abroad were 
supposed to be registered as “foreign agents”. 
these are only a few from the list of absurd 
legal norms introduced by the controversial 
laws. they sparked uproar in Ukrainian so-
ciety and were dubbed by journalists as the 
“dictatorship laws”. In their comments on the 
new laws, however, state officials argued that 
similar provisions existed in many European 
countries.
On January 19th, the Epiphany festival 
in Ukraine, there were massive protest rallies 
in many Ukrainian cities; protesters in Kiev’s 
EuroMaidan expected from the opposition 
an action plan against the dictatorship and 
the name of a leader of the resistance move-
ment. When arseniy yatsenyuk, the leader of 
Batkivshchyna, declared in his speech that the 
only protest leader is the Ukrainian people, 
EuroMaidan took his words as mockery. the 
anger spilled over, especially among the most 
radical protesters. Right radicals clashed with 
the police lines on their way to parliament in 
Hrushevskoho street. Protesters, led by the 
“Right sector”, threw Molotov cocktails; the 
police responded with fire from traumatic 
weapons. From time to time, fighters of riot-
police Berkut would leave their lines to snatch 
and violently beat a protester. In response, the 
radicals set on fire several police buses. A few 
hours into the confrontation, a water gun was 
brought from the side of the Verkhovna Rada 
and started to spurt water on the protesters. 
Considering that the temperatures in Kiev 
were well below zero, such government’s ac-
tions amount to torture in accordance with 
the international law. Later police officials 
claimed that the water gun was used to put 
down the fire of the burning bus. In actual 
fact, however, the bus had completely burned 
down long before that.
A popular game: “block Berkut”
the government called for additional 
police forces and Berkut units from all over 
Ukraine to reinforce its positions in the capi-
tal. the protest movement responded with a 
surprising efficient self-organizing measure. 
the information about the police mobilization 
quickly spread in the regions, with people all 
over the country organizing blockades of the 
police units and Berkut bases, and coordinat-
ing their activities through social networks. 
Roads and exits from military units were ef-
fectively blocked. this campaign helped to 
obstruct the movement of police forces in 
Lviv, Volyn, Rivno, Ivano-frankivsk, ter-
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nopil, Odessa and transcarpathian regions.
I was lucky to take part in a night shift at a 
police base in Lviv. all the exits from the base 
are blocked with car tires; every block post has 
its own kitchen and a fire to keep warm. The 
posts have radio connection; if necessary the 
activists can move from one post to another. 
Since the weather is cold, volunteers join the 
blockade for two-three hours. and concerned 
Lviv residents bring them hot drinks, soup, 
sandwiches, hot bottles and warm gloves. The 
atmosphere at such block posts is incredible – 
people easily get along together for a common 
goal. they realize that their task is not to let 
through police reinforcement units who will 
use force against the protesters in Kiev. 
the ten block posts are constantly 
manned by around a hundred people who feel 
honoured to sacrifice some of their personal 
time for the success of the revolution. the city 
council building is decorated with a meaning-
ful slogan “a free place for free people”.
The revolutionary administration
After the news of the first deaths in Kiev, 
Lviv announced a strike. Local people gath-
ered in front of the regional administration 
and made their way inside to demand answers 
from the head of Lviv regional administration 
Oleh Salo, appointed by yanukovych. Under 
the pressure from the infuriated citizens, Salo 
submitted his resignation. But the protesters 
decided to stay in the building and keep it un-
der control. the entrance to the government 
building is obstructed by a barricade and is 
guarded by civil and party activists. Recently 
they had an argument about the division of 
control in the building, but managed to sort 
it out. the overtaking of Lviv state adminis-
tration had a domino effect – it was followed 
by similar occupations of state institutions in 
a dozen of Ukraine’s regions with low pro-
government support. On January 30th the ac-
tivists responded to the request of the head of 
the regional council of deputies and vacated 
the buildings. However, the administration 
remains under control of the People’s council, 
which was formed by the Maidan.
It is quite clear now that the struggle will 
go on, and the residents of Lviv will have a 
strong role in it. although the Verkhovna 
Every participant at the Kyiv Euromaidan received this 
message on his cell phone: “dear customer, you are 
registered as a participant of a mass riot.” 
“dear operator, you may kiss my revolutionary ass.”
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Rada scrapped the dictatorship laws, the 
president was not in hurry to sign this deci-
sion into law. the newly adopted amnesty 
law for the arrested activists has been labeled 
a “hostages law”. Local people are also out-
raged by the fact that two of their compatri-
ots from Lviv – yuriy Verbytskiy and Roman 
Senyk – were killed in the past few days. the 
tension is high in Lviv, as it is in Kiev. arseniy 
yatsenyuk’s words on the Ukrainian people as 
the only leader of the resistance turned out to 
be prophetic. the nation is tired of waiting for 
European sanctions and decisive actions from 
the politicians. Ukrainians have dramatically 
taken the process of building a new country in 
their own hands. their main principle is self-
management. EuroMaidan has self-defense 
units – a prototype of a military and police 
force; medical volunteers, a kitchen, a group 
of its own lawyers. If necessary, it will find its 
own economists, financial specialists, diplo-
mats and tax officials. EuroMaidan has made 
clear one simple truth: it is possible to function 
without official state institutions, which makes 
life only better. When needed, people can form 
their own self-management institutions and 
provide them with official powers. 
translated by  Vladyslava Reznyk
Pavlo Ostrovs‘kyj
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Euromaidan 2013 was born as a peaceful protest and later an uprising of Ukrainian 
people against: the lies of the authorities and 
pro-government forces, violations of human 
rights and basic freedoms, abuse of the law, 
state pressure on all levels, humiliation and 
distortion of values, concepts, meanings.
 In 2004 the events that led to the Orange 
revolution and a re-run election of the Presi-
dent of Ukraine included systematic violations 
of electoral rights and freedom of speech on 
the part of the authorities. they were opposed 
by Ukrainians who took to the streets to pro-
test against the rigged result of the election. 
Numerous systematic violations were later 
acknowledged in a historical decision of the 
Supreme Court of Ukraine.
this time the situation is more complex. 
the president of Ukraine and government of-
ficials have committed systematic violations 
of human rights, enshrined above all in article 
39 (freedom of peaceful assembly), article 28 
(right to being treated with dignity), article 29 
(right to freedom and personal integrity), ar-
ticle 34 (right to freedom of speech and free 
expression of thought and beliefs), article 
55 (right to a fair trial) of the Constitution of 
Ukraine and the corresponding articles of 
the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and fundamental freedoms, to which 
Ukraine is a party. Moreover, the authorities 
and state officials have committed grave viola-
tions of the principle of the rule of law, guar-
anteed in part 1, article 8 of the Constitution, 
together with the constitutional principle of 
article 19, which states that state officials are 
obliged to act only on the grounds and in the 
manner envisaged by the Constitution and the 
laws of Ukraine.
by Larysa denysenko, Kiev
beginning of February 2014
Laws are for “Suckers”, not for “Big Shots” 
We are now facing a situation when the 
constitutional and conventional mechanisms, 
as well as the laws, are powerless to resist the 
usurpation of power by the president, who 
suppressed the legislative, executive and judi-
cial branches of power in the country. 
Ukrainian parliament, dominated by the 
parliamentary majority of the president’s rul-
ing party and its traditional allies the commu-
nists, blocked the possibility of a legitimate 
resignation of the current government. a cor-
responding bill was proposed by the opposi-
tion but was not voted by parliament, making 
it impossible from a procedural point of view 
to raise the issue in parliament again this year. 
the anti-constitutional violence was or-
chestrated and directed by representatives of 
the executive power. the special police unit 
“Berkut” - part of Ukraine’s law enforcement 
system - committed violations of a number of 
Constitutional provisions by conducting a vi-
olent dispersal of the peaceful protesters in the 
Independence Square. they had to be rescued 
by the Church who provided shelter to the 
victims and saved them from further violence.
 Currently, we observe violations of 
Ukraine’s criminal law, the law on police, and 
the norms concerned with administrative vio-
lations against the protesters who took part in 
automaidan motorcades. they are persecuted 
by traffic police, summoned for interrogations 
and are subject to police raids at home ad-
dresses.
Moreover, the pro-government forces 
exert a constant pressure on the vulner-
able part of Ukrainian society, especially 
the employees of state enterprises on the 
state budget payroll. the authorities use 
pressure, intimidation and threats against 
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those who dare to peacefully resist injustice.
 In recognition of an active role of Ukrai-
nian students in the current events, the Min-
istry of Education and Science of Ukraine has 
colluded with the Security service in violation 
of articles 7, 8 and 14 of the Law on Personal 
data Protection. they force university and 
college teachers to reveal personal data of stu-
dent protesters and threaten them with expul-
sion from higher education institutions.
Ukrainian courts have demonstrated their 
complete lack of independence from the exec-
utive and the president. By an “order” of Kiev 
state administration and in violation of the 
constitutional norms, they have curtailed the 
right to peaceful assembly in the city without 
providing a legal justification for such a deci-
sion.    
On december 19th 2013, the constitution-
al majority in parliament effectively replaced 
the judiciary by passing a law “On eliminat-
ing negative consequences, preventing pros-
ecution and punishing people in connection 
with events taking place during peaceful as-
semblies”. the law guarantees freedom from 
criminal prosecution to all participants of 
peaceful assemblies and protest actions. the 
courts, however, continue to ignore the law; as 
of december 2013, many protesters remained 
in detention.
On January 16th 2014, parliament adopt-
ed a number of repressive laws in a hasty pro-
cedure that violated the procedural code, the 
constitution and certain decisions of the Con-
stitutional Court of Ukraine. Regardless of the 
violations, the president signed the laws and 
made them effective on January 17th. The laws 
significantly reduce the scope of human rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution 
of Ukraine (which is directly forbidden in part 
3 article 22 of the Constitution), and enshrined 
in international treaties to which Ukraine is 
a party, such as the European Convention of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. all these laws are 
intended to strengthen and legitimise an ugly 
symbiosis of a criminal-police state, whose 
citizens are suppressed by the authorities for 
any critical comment, thought, or statement; 
for free movement and peaceful assemblies. In 
other words, the laws adopted with numerous 
violations and in direct violation of the Consti-
tution seek to legalise repressions.
In accordance with the principles, laid 
down in the decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights, state authorities and state 
officials should carry positive and procedural 
commitments.
 In particular, this concerns establishing 
precise and clear rules, defined in the special 
law on peaceful assemblies, which has not so 
far been approved by parliament. at the same 
time, however, the so-called “January 16 laws” 
introduced an additional article 110-1 to the 
Criminal Code of Ukraine, which establishes 
criminal liability for very loosely defined “ex-
tremist activity” (including “extremist” com-
ments in the internet and social networks).
Because of the state’s complete failure to 
meet its commitments in the protection of the 
citizens’ rights and freedoms, the Ukrainian 
people rely directly on the constitutional pro-
visions. the realisation of this right, however, 
is obstructed by courts, whose direct responsi-
bility should be to ensure its full implementa-
tion. 
 Moreover, first-tier courts have been en-
gaged in an unacceptable practice of turning 
the victims of state violence into perpetrators. 
In their decisions they tend to resort to an out-
rageously disproportionate punishing mea-
sure of preventive detention. 
although courts of appeal have been 
partly able to redeem the situation, profes-
Larysa denysenko
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sional conduct of some of the first-tier judges 
raises doubts about their commitment to jus-
tice as one of the basic constitutional premises. 
a judicial system which should be based on 
a subtle understanding of justice consistently 
undermines it by turning the victims into 
criminals.
The violence committed by “Berkut” took 
place in violation of a constitutional norm al-
lowing law enforcement officials to refuse car-
rying out a criminal order. this was the result 
of yet another violation - the unlawful actions 
of the law enforcement authorities who disre-
garded article 29 of a special law on policing 
by authorising law enforcement activity at 
night time.
It is worth emphasising that the introduc-
tion of the so-called “laws of January 16” guar-
antees impunity to police and “law enforce-
ment” officials responsible for carrying out the 
brutal dispersal of the peaceful protesters in 
the Maidan. the fact that this sort of an “indul-
gence letter” was provided to the perpetrators 
by members of the pro-government parlia-
mentary parties and the president proves - for 
me - that the unlawful orders of a clampdown 
came from most senior state officials.
thus, the actions of the president of 
Ukraine and state authorities of all branches 
of power - legislative, executive and even ju-
diciary - subvert article 5 of the Constitution 
of Ukraine declaring the Ukrainian people as 
the bearer of sovereignty and the sole source 
of power in the country. 
In critical conditions, the people are al-
lowed to act according to the principle of di-
rect democracy and defend their rights in a 
peaceful protest, relying exclusively on direct 
application of the constitutional norms and the 
provisions of Ukraine’s international treaties.
a peaceful protest lasted until the adop-
tion of the so-called “laws” on January 16th, 
which effectively crushed the existence of 
freedom of peaceful assembly in the country 
as such. this led to a new form of confronta-
tion.
the people of a nation has a right to re-
bellion* under the circumstances when it is 
otherwise impossible to abolish a government 
- a government which will not voluntarily re-
sign, which adopts anti-constitutional laws, 
which ignores the principle enshrined in ar-
ticle 19 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which 
manipulates the country’s courts and law en-
forcement services, and which commits daily 
violations of constitutional and international 
treaties provisions. 
It is a legitimate right of the people which 
- although not directly proclaimed by the Con-
stitution - can be explained and justified by a 
number of existing constitutional norms (in 
the Constitution of Lithuania, for example, 
this right is directly acknowledged). It is a 
right advocated in the works of the famous 
philosopher John Locke and mentioned in 
various international documents. 
In accordance with the Universal declara-
tion of Human Rights (a binding international 
treaty for Ukraine, according to article 9 of the 
Constitution): “ it is essential, if man is not to 
be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, 
to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, 
that human rights should be protected by the 
rule of law”. 
But the legitimate actions of the protest-
ers were met with even more oppression on 
the part of the government, including violence 
that left several people dead, beatings and 
persecution.
Why is all this happening? the person 
who currently holds office of the President of 
Ukraine is a criminal, twice convicted of vio-
lent crimes against personal property.
the political elite in modern Ukraine does 
* author’s emphasis 
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not feature descendants of the aristocracy, 
who were subject to systematic extermination 
at all periods of the nation’s history. Instead, 
the country gave birth to a genetically defec-
tive elite - comprising of party bureaucracy 
with hereditary richesse, on the one hand, and 
business elite with largely illegally accumu-
lated wealth, on the other. to put it simpler, 
the country is ruled by thieves and party func-
tionaries. But in this particular case, we have 
to deal with ordinary criminal thugs of the 
lowest rung.
It is a difficult and painful question why 
the Ukrainians had to elect this particular per-
son as their president. Regardless of the fact 
that the elections were to a great extent rigged, 
one has to admit that Viktor yanukovych has a 
large electoral base. Some saw in him a “strong 
hand”, a “simple lad like us” or indeed a “per-
son who knew suffering”. 
Soviet prison system was meant to cripple 
and destroy people. It was especially damag-
ing for those who already had rather shaky 
moral principles. Prison may not necessar-
ily kill a human but it does kill humaneness. 
Prison lives by its own rules, laws and habits. 
those do not include respect for human dig-
nity, rights and freedoms. In fact, there are no 
rights and freedoms in prison. 
When a prisoner goes back to normal life, 
he tends - unconsciously or otherwise - to ap-
ply the same rules that exist behind bars in 
free life.
Such people live by the right of force, 
by the right of a “big boss”; it is as if they 
have a microchip of discrimination placed 
under their skin - it is a mechanism dictat-
ing to humiliate the weak, to intimidate, to 
bully; requiring to annihilate a strong and 
principled opponent to be able to intimidate 
the weak, to suppress them and oppress 
their will. The complete disregard for val-
ues and rights is the matrix of a criminal.* 
a characteristic recent episode is the vile 
attack on the journalist Tetyana Chornovil, fa-
mous for her exposure of corruption among 
Ukraine’s highest criminals-in-office, such 
as the president, prime-minister and the in-
terior minister. She was attacked at night on 
the Kyiv-Boryspil motorway and violently 
beaten. It is worth paying a special attention 
to the official cynicism and the complete lack 
of professionalism in the police actions - after 
the attack they opened an investigation on the 
grounds of “hooliganism”, a criminal code 
article which mainly deals with public order 
violations. While the victim remained in in-
tensive care, with medically confirmed serious 
to severe injuries, the authorities gave in to the 
pressure on the part of the media and human 
rights defenders and reclassified the crime. If 
we take into account the time of the crime, its 
details, the victim’s professional and opposi-
tional activity, and the lack of transparence 
in the police investigation, we may come to a 
conclusion that the attack can be qualified as 
a contracted attempted murder. The authori-
ties in the meantime are trying to present the 
crime as a banal road accident gone wrong.
an avalanche of human rights abuse is 
getting worse and more horrifying. After the 
beatings, violence and torture by the police, 
the authorities failed to prevent the deaths of 
least five people. “Berkut” continues to perse-
cute people and torture them with brutality 
and cynicism. there is ghastly video footage 
of many episodes available online; Ukrainians 
who can’t remain indifferent try to document 
the crimes by collecting evidence and video 
materials.    
Laws are for “suckers”, not for “big shots”. 
the “suckers” are we, ordinary Ukrainians, as 
has been well demonstrated by the so-called 
“laws” of January 16th. and as for “big shots”, 
* author’s emphasis 
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they know no laws and may completely ig-
nore them. Hence, the president’s actions are 
absolutely logical and predictable within his 
mindset. all other branches of power act cor-
respondingly - in a conscious or unconscious 
hierarchical imitation of the “big boss”.
the president’s inner circle contains per-
sonalities with an easily recognisable criminal 
past; one may even get an impression that the 
rampant gangsterism of the early 90s is re-
turning to plague our country as it did at the 
beginning of its independence. the bandits 
grew muscles, they sharpened their fangs, 
they have caught Ukrainians unprepared for 
such a huge amnesty and the criminals’ as-
cension to big and small thrones. 
“Berkut”s savage attack against the peace-
ful protesters can be also seen in this light. In 
the criminal world the allegiance - and espe-
cially of those lower in the hierarchy - must be 
tied in blood. It is a mutual bloody cover-up, 
which makes the subordinates more obedient, 
more submissible, more dependable. It also 
makes it easier to turn them into scapegoats 
and hold responsible for everything.  
In Christian church believers partake of 
the blood of Christ from the priest’s hands; 
Ukrainian officials “partook” of the blood of 
victims from the hands of their “big boss”.
the perverse culture of total “circular cov-
er-up” reveals itself in the alleged resignations 
of some minor government officials and inves-
tigations against certain representatives of the 
state, whose names and official positions re-
main unknown. It is an unacceptable fact, con-
sidering these people’s public role and status.
The Ukrainian people are fighting 
against this system by:
- establishing the principle of direct de-
mocracy;
- conducting peaceful protests to defend 
their human rights and freedoms;
- defending Ukraine’s European choice;
- demanding the resignation and court 
trials of state officials whose actions violate 
the Constitution of Ukraine;
- aiming to change not only the govern-
ment but mainly the whole political system; 
to achieve a new quality and essence of state 
reforms and state officials.
It is necessary to emphasise that perhaps 
for the first time in the history of Ukrainian 
confrontations, Euromaidan does not sim-
ply raise the most pressing and immediate 
question of changing the government. the 
Euromaidan movement involves the work of 
analysts, independent experts, various pro-
fessionals, small and medium size business 
entrepreneurs, scholars and artists, who on 
their own initiative develop projects of a to-
tal change and reload of the current political 
system that has completely discredited and 
practically destroyed itself. Political system 
transformation should become the most im-
portant task for a new people’s government in 
the future. 
One of the main issues here is the lustra-
tion. Many analysts argue that, unlike Germa-
ny, the Czech Republic, Poland and Lithuania, 
Ukraine has been fatally slow with starting 
the process of lustration. As a result, indepen-
dent Ukraine has admitted into its govern-
ment elite former communist party officials 
and members of secret services who used to 
work for and maintain the repressive system 
of the Soviet power. One can’t but agree. 
the opposition that came to power in 
2004 wasted the country’s chance for lustra-
tion, provided by the Orange revolution. It 
was a chance to lustrate the officials responsi-
ble for systematic violations of electoral rights, 
freedom of thought and freedom of speech in 
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Ukraine. this failure had a number of negative 
consequences, which can be illustrated by the 
following example.
Serhiy Kivalov, then head of the Cen-
tral election commission whose negative 
role during the elections was recognised by 
the Supreme Court of Ukraine, is currently 
head of the parliamentary committee on the 
rule of law and justice. He is in charge of le-
gal issues and the provision of legal edu-
cation, which is an utter nonsense, consid-
ering the accusations against Kivalov as a 
state official whose duty was to ensure a fair 
and transparent election but who instead 
got involved in a massive electoral fraud. 
It is then of utmost importance to en-
sure that this time a law on lustration will 
be implemented to prevent those officials, 
who by their anti-constitutional acts or com-
placent passivity caused systematic viola-
tions of human rights and freedoms in the 
country, from serving in all branches of state 
power, including local government, educa-
tional and scientific institutions, courts and 
bar, armed forces and other military units, 
tax and customs authorities and other state 
institutions with quasi-judicial functions. 
Of no less importance is the issue of individ-
ual re-accreditation of all judges, state officials, 
and members of law enforcement agencies, 
which could allow to identify those people who 
have no moral right to occupy their positions 
or be engaged in similar professional activities.
Systematic changes will be required in al-
most all spheres of public life to avoid the pos-
sibility of systematic violations of human rights 
and freedoms in the future. this is a project that 
many independent analysts and experts have 
been working on. It is a project for everyone 
who cares for Ukraine’s future, who feels per-
sonally responsible for the quality of life, qual-
ity of people, quality of the state in our country.
translated by  Vladyslava Reznyk 
About the Author: 
Larysa denysenko is writer and lawyer. 
Her literary career began in 2002 with the 
victory at the literary contest ‘Crowning the 
Word’. Larysa denysenko is the author of 12 
books for adults and 3 books for children. She 
was born in 1973 in Kyiv. She graduated from 
the law faculty of taras Shevchenko Kyiv Na-
tional University, passed a law draft course 
at the Justice department of the Netherlands. 
She is one of the attorneys who represent 
the human rights in European Court of Hu-
man Rights (Strasburg). She worked for the 
Justice Department of Ukraine as a scientific 
consultant in specialized parliamentary com-
mittee, managed the national department of 
‘transparency International’.  Several years 
she combinated her legal practice with work 
at nation-wide 1+1 Channel, where she is the 
author and the host of culturological program 
‘document +’.
e-mail: larysa_d@voliacable.com
32Euxeinos 13 (2014)
When the Soviet Union was dismantled in the early 1990s, the Ukrainian au-
thor and civil rights activist Dmytro Pavlyčko 
stated with regard to the significance of the 
Ukrainian national poet taras Shevchenko 
(1814-1861): “Our rebirth is taking place un-
der the flags and slogans of Shevchenko”. 
Even during and after the Orange Revolution 
Shevchenko played a positive role as an icon 
for the unity of the then politically and socio-
culturally heterogeneous regions. the life and 
works of Shevchenko are seen in the tradition-
alist discourse by many Ukrainians as a sym-
bol of the country, culture and history. the 
classical western Ukrainian author of the 19th 
century Ivan franko (1856-1916) and the char-
ismatic representative of Ukrainian modernity 
Lesja Ukrajinka (1871-1913) hold a compara-
ble, but less influential position as intellectual 
and moral authorities. With attributions such 
as prophet (Shevchenko), stone crusher and 
conscience of the people (franko), or “chain-
breaking daughter” of the Prometheus (Ukra-
jinka) these authors are given the function of 
creating a national identity and securing cul-
tural continuity. these three authors are en-
gaged as heroes and identity-creating figures 
on the basis of a tradition of “national awak-
ening” and “nation-building” which has its 
roots in the 19th century. this tendency was 
even intensified during Soviet times because 
of the educational and propagandistic func-
tion of the literature of socialist realism. this 
tradition shaped a literary discourse, which 
continuously comprised the national commit-
ment and responsibility of the authors and 
their works and persisted into the early 1990s. 
due to the numerous restrictions on the 
Ukrainian language in tsarist Russia begin-
by alexander Kratochvil, Prague
7 February 2014
The Writers and the Maidan 
ning with Peter I. and the creeping Russifica-
tion of Ukrainian culture and society in the 
20th century during the Soviet Union, the cul-
tivation of language always was an important 
factor for Ukrainian identity. No Ukrainian 
author could elude this aspect of preserving 
cultural identity, as the extent to which au-
thors were committed to their language and 
culture was an important indicator of patrio-
tism in Soviet times and afterwards. However, 
this patriotism was ambivalent as the Stalin-
ist repressions at the beginning of the 1930s 
heralded a process through which the Soviet 
Ukrainian authors generally unconsciously 
undermined the attractiveness and vitality of 
the Ukrainian language and literature by pre-
serving Ukrainian literature in the folkloric 
forms of the 19th century. this was accompa-
nied by an increasing disinterest in the litera-
ture and the marginalization of the Ukrainian 
language as a conveyor of this literature. With 
a combination of socio-political factors of Rus-
sification, this led to an intended loss of pres-
tige of the Ukrainian language and literature 
as a whole.
at the beginning of the 1990s, the gener-
ation of authors born in the 1960s and early 
1970s began to question and programmatical-
ly deconstruct this discourse surrounding the 
national and social mission, for example with 
the carnival literature derived from Michail 
Bachtin, whose most renowned representa-
tive is the internationally known author Jurij 
andrukhchovych (born in 1960), or with the 
prose of Oksana Zabuzhko (born 1960), which 
deals with gender-related and post-colonial 
issues and has also been translated into other 
languages. this generation rejected the social 
obligations and political functions of writers 
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all the more because those established authors 
from the older generation who became po-
litically active in the early 1990s (e.g. dmytro 
Pavlyčchko or Ivan Drachč), were unsuccess-
ful and soon appeared to be politically cor-
rupted. the new literature of the Zabuzhko-
andrukhovych generation of the 1990s was, 
by contrast, political in the sense that it reflect-
ed the specifically national and historical con-
stellations of Ukraine, which emerged during 
the cultural and political transformations, and 
revealed the ideological constructs of the past 
with its metanarratives and aesthetic strategies 
in a playful manner. These forms of reflection 
also comprised present works and authors of 
Soviet and anti-Soviet orientation, which re-
sulted in significant tensions in the Ukrainian 
literary scene1. 
the handling of the historical self-image, 
cultural remembrance and national identifica-
tion strategies in the second half of the 1990s 
had a massive impact on the organization and 
the institutions of literary life in Ukraine. It 
became decentralized according to regional, 
socio-political, aesthetic and institutional char-
acteristics2. this trend continued into the new 
millennium. the generation of authors fol-
lowing Zabuzhko and andrukhovych belong 
1 For example Andruchovyč, Ju. 
Rekreaciji, different editions (printed first in 
1992); Andruchovyč, Ju. Moskovijada, different 
editions. (first printed in 1993), Zabužko, O. Polovi 
dosldžennja z ukrajins’koho seksu, different 
editions (first printed in 1996), Irvanec’, O. Rivne-
Rovno, different editions (first printed in 2001). 
2 See also Mala Ukrajins’ka encyklopedija 
aktual’noji literatury. Proekt povernennja 
demiurhiv. (eds.) Ješkilev, V., Andruchovyč, 
Ju. In: Pleroma 3/ 1998; in greater detail see 
also Kratochvil, A. Aufbruch und Rückkehr. 
Ukrainische und tschechische Prosa im Zeichen 
der Postmoderne. Berlin 2013, pp. 53-73; for the 
restructuring of the literary canon, see. Hundorova, 
t: the Canon Reversed. New Ukrainian Literature.
of the 1990s. In: Journal of Ukrainian Studies, 
Nr. 26, Summer-winter 2001, pp. 249-270.
to the global millennium generation, which 
according to the recently debated cover story 
by the american social scientist Joel Stein in 
“time Magazine” is ironically called the “me 
me me generation”. this generation is regard-
ed as apolitical and socially passive. the pro-
tagonists in this literature, which is often cat-
egorized as pop culture, depict themselves in 
their environment in a self-centered manner. 
However, this self-centeredness is only 
apolitical, when it is measured with a tradi-
tional, institutionally oriented and normative 
political concept that is linked to parties and 
ideological programs. Starting from their own 
interests and a non-institutionally anchored 
and organized, rather individual commit-
ment, the generation is indeed political in the 
sense of civil society involvement. the devel-
opment of civil society is also seen as a way of 
leaving post-Soviet thinking behind. this at-
titude is clearly reflected in literature, cinema 
and music. Irena Karpa (born in 1980) pro-
vides an example of this in her novel Bitches 
get everything, in which she describes the ex-
periences of a Ukrainian actor and director; in 
the novel there are repeated references to the 
consistently ongoing politicized issue of the 
usage of the Ukrainian language:
“– ‘My sweetheart, you know, if you ever 
want to achieve anything, you have to eradi-
cate all ‘Little Russian’ things in you. Stay 
for a while here in Moscow, visit the theater 
language course, and assimilate here. .. this 
is what all actresses from Ukraine did here. 
Schulschenko, for example ...’ 
and then everybody – cameramen, pro-
ducers and directors – started to boast how 
their mothers or fathers returned to Moscow 
from tbilisi, yerevan, Kharkov, or tallinn af-
ter the war, crammed Russian poems, prac-
ticed theatrical language from morning to 
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night, and strictly forbade themselves from 
articulating one single word in the provincial 
languages of the losers that they had left be-
hind.
– ‘and look, they accomplished every-
thing! – yelled someone and drew strong ap-
plause. 
Trisha smiles amicably […] – ‘Thank 
you very much, my dears’, – thought tri-
sha and grinned widely. you are all really 
very kind, but I could care less about your 
recipes for success. Why should I destroy 
something inside me? I came to create some-
thing – myself and something around me. 
I will go home and build my own empire. 
this is how everything always begins.“3
Like in their literary text, the younger 
authors also take a different approach in 
their public appearances than the “Zabužko-
Andruchovýč generation”, which appealed to 
a more intellectual audience in their lectures, 
essays and newspaper interviews. the young-
er authors like Serhij Žadan (born in 1974), 
Irena Karpa, Larysa denysenko (1973) use 
more popular, mass media formats including 
social networks. By participating in concerts, 
demonstrations, civil disobedience activi-
ties, they took on a public relations function 
and attracted attention to the events. Popu-
lar musicians and bands such as the Eurovi-
sion Song Contest winner Ruslana Lyzhyc’ka 
(born in 1973) or taras Chubaj (born in 
1970) and Svjatoslavrs Vakarchuk (born in 
1975) also have a high profile in this regard. 
In the past the artists tended to only sel-
dom state their social or political position. this 
changed with the 2013 Euro-Maidan at the lat-
est. Both the actors who at the beginning of the 
protest movement were primarily students or 
3 Karpa, I. Bitches get everything. 
Charkiv 2007. pp. 184-185 (translation aK)
younger people, as well as the observers of the 
Maidan movement alluded to their indepen-
dence from the political parties time and time 
again during the first weeks and massively de-
fended themselves against being swallowed 
and manipulated by the opposition parties. 
In their performances and statements authors 
and musicians such as Zhadan, Karpa or Rus-
lana supported this renunciation of the tra-
ditional parties and the institutionalized and 
generally corrupt post-Soviet politics. they 
assisted the civil society activities surround-
ing the Maidan movement and the social ac-
tions based on the activities of individuals and 
groups. thus, Maidan developed its own or-
ganizational and social structures during the 
week-long protests.  
Politicians from the established parties as 
well as the opposition parties lagged behind 
the potential of civil society as represented 
by the Maidan, which as denysenko stated 
became the “germ cell” of the new Ukrainian 
politics. there will be no déjà-vu of a second 
Orange Revolution resulting in the restoration 
of the “old system”, because – in addition to 
the different political context – the Euro-Maid-
an is being carried out and organized by a dif-
ferent and younger  generation. and they did 
not take to the streets because of a president 
and as andrej Kurkov writes “they do not 
want their ideas to be packed into the slogans 
of the opposition parties. they will not let any-
one take away their independence and dig-
nity. therefore it is not their objective to put 
someone in office, rather to live in a civilized, 
European Ukraine” (taz, 9 december 2013). 
after approximately three weeks of dem-
onstrations and protests, the moment arrived 
at which the representatives of the protest 
movement realized that the Maidan demands 
can hardly be met without including opposi-
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tion politicians. thus, the Ukrainian writers ul-
timately lent their voice to the opposition poli-
ticians for the formulation of a first political 
action program, which stated the short-term 
and medium-term objectives of the Maidan 
movement and called on Jacenjuk, tjahnybok 
and Klitschko to finally act in a convincing 
way on the basis of a clear-cut program. the 
agenda 5/12 was prepared by Irena Karpa and 
Viktorija Narizhna and immediately signed by 
several thousand people. Members of all gen-
erations joined the call, and subsequently the 
younger and middle-aged authors met in a 
literal and figurative sense on Maidan Square. 
this resulted in additional initiatives (e.g. on 
social networks with the popular ironical com-
ments of Jurij Vynnychuk, the media appear-
ances of Zabuzhko and Zhadan, which had 
legal consequences, or Andruchovyč’s Open 
Letter to Foreign Media). 
the agenda 5/12 can be divided into a 
catalogue of demands with three foci. The first 
pertains to social issues such as the protection 
of the protesters from police violence as well 
as the release of the political prisoners. the 
second point concerns the political system and 
demands for the government to resign, the 
signing of the association agreement with the 
European Union, a new electoral law, a lustra-
tion law as well as demands for a change to 
the constitution regarding the powers of the 
president. the third point appeals more to the 
emotional level and explicitly calls on opposi-
tion politicians to do their work as politicians 
and present a reform program for the first year 
of government. the proponents of the agenda 
expressed their wholehearted support to the 
opposition politicians. 
the point in time for the agenda 5/12 was 
well chosen, directly before the mass mobili-
zation on the second Sunday of december on 
which the “March of Millions” took place in 
Kiev. In the authors’ view the enormous pow-
er of the protest definitely required an action 
and reform program for the time after Maid-
an. they stated that a Plan B and Plan C would 
probably also be necessary, in case there are 
riots and police crackdowns and a state of 
emergency is declared. all of this had been 
ominously looming in the air for weeks. the 
writers now gave the cues to their politicians. 
they stressed that “despite their deep antipa-
thy towards Janukovych they do not want his 
head, rather wish to have their own country 
back for themselves, a country in which there 
will be no place for figures such as Janukovych 
and asarov as well as for titushky4 and thugs 
from the Berkut special unit.”  
the authors emphasize how poorly the 
ruling politicians deal with the state entrusted 
to them and the people and how they view the 
state and its people as resources for their per-
sonal enrichment like in some form of stone-
age capitalism. according to them, Janu-
kovych is someone who since taking office has 
acted like an occupier of Ukraine who stops at 
no one and nothing. this “occupier” came to 
power due to the failure and weakness of the 
Orange politicians. 
the total rejection of the current political 
regime by so many and primarily young peo-
ple is a revolt against political incompetence 
and the arrogance of power. after the bloody 
police crackdown on peaceful demonstrators 
in late November on Maidan Square, Larysa 
denysenko directly addressed Janukovych in 
writing: “you have no lifeline and no line of 
4 Strong, younger men, who were 
partially hired on short notice by government-
related organizations or by the Party of the 
Regions, in order to provoke riots during the 
peaceful demonstrations against the  Janukovyč 
government  or to directly attack smaller groups 
of gvonerment critics or individual persons. 
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destiny anymore. the youth of this country 
has risen against you. you have no future any-
more.” 
In recent years in Ukraine, authors from 
the younger generation such as Karpa, de-
nysenko and Zhadan have tackled issues of 
identity, cultural remembrance and individ-
ual position in a globalized world. In addi-
tion to the already mentioned novel by Karpa 
Bitches get everything, their works include, for 
example, denysenko with her novel Echoes 
about a young German woman, who follows 
the tracks of her grandfather during the Sec-
ond World War in Ukraine or the novel by 
Žadan Vorošilovhrad  (translated recently into 
German). the students’ and young protest-
ers’ rigid rejection of the political exploitation 
of the Euro-Maidan demonstrations, which 
were joined by large parts of the population 
of central and western Ukraine, and the orga-
nization of the Maidan as a field for social ac-
tion by groups independent of the state is an 
expression of a civil society mindset aimed at 
a reconfiguration of Ukrainian politics. This 
mindset was also defined in the “Agenda 5/12 
of the authors as a mission for policy-makers. 
It appears as if the authors and intellectuals 
had abandoned the traditional role of writers 
in Ukraine as a voice and prophet of the peo-
ple as attributed to Taras Shevchenko in the 
19th and 20th century. the authors are hardly 
interested in a national, political ideology with 
a social mission anymore. With their text and 
media appearances they are more focused on 
civil society themes and take a stand against 
the post-Soviet politics aimed at retaining 
power, which today‘s – or actually yesterday’s 
– political elite represents.  Zhadan described 
the youth at the Euro-Maidan as the “non-lost 
generation”, which is pitted against cannibals 
- “cannibals” who could simply eat up their 
opponents within the boundaries of dialogue. 
yet what these opponents will do with the 
cannibals is not entirely certain”. and that is a 
reason for hope …
translated by  Michael Dobbins
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Crimean Passions Around EuroMaidan: An Active Pro-European 
Minority of Crimeans Against the Autonomous Republic’s 
Pro-Eurasian Authorities and an Ambivalent Majority
It is obvious: Euromaidan has already be-come a phenomenon of Ukraine’s social 
and political life, even regardless of the fact 
that formally it has achieved none of its pub-
licly proclaimed goals - such as signing an 
association agreement with the EU, bringing 
to justice those responsible for the violent 
dispersal of student protesters on November 
30th, and a radical re-formatting of Ukrainian 
government on both institutional and indi-
vidual levels. Moreover, Euromaidan has no-
tably changed the socio-political climate in the 
country and is instrumental in creating a posi-
tive image of the Ukrainian people abroad. 
One thing that makes Euromaidan different 
from its predecessors - “the granite revolu-
tion”, “Rise up, Ukraine!” campaign, the tax 
Maidan and even the Orange revolution - is its 
sheer scale. a Euromaidan rally In december 
2013 (the so-called Veche) saw a record num-
ber of protesters in Ukrainian history. accord-
ing to Sweden’s foreign Minister Carl Bildt, it 
was also the largest pro-European demonstra-
tion in Europe. One may add that this protest 
is also likely to last longer than the Orange 
Maidan.
 The main difference, however, lies in Eu-
romaidan’s new quality as compared to pre-
vious Ukrainian protest campaigns. In 2004 
Orange revolution supporters pledged their 
hope for a better life in the country with Viktor 
yushchenko, a candidate in the presidential 
election, making his name the most popular 
slogan in Maidan: “yushchenko!”. But when 
the elected president failed in his actions and 
excelled in his inability to act, a wave of revo-
lutionary enthusiasm was replaced by a sense 
of profound disillusionment and political apa-
thy on the part of orange revolution activists 
and supporters. Some politicians and analysts 
even believed that this experience made the 
Ukrainian society immune to future mass-
scale protest actions. Such analyses, however, 
proved completely wrong. deepening eco-
nomic problems and, specifically, the risk of 
a default, together with a curb on civil rights 
and restrictions of the freedom of expression, 
led to an escalation in the protest potential. the 
government’s decision on 21 November 2013 
to suspend the preparations for an association 
agreement with the EU detonated a bomb of 
public unrest manifesting many Ukrainians’ 
dissatisfaction with the state of the country 
and their support for Euro-integration. a new 
powerful impulse to the momentum of the 
protests was given by the violent crackdown 
of the anti-riot police “Berkut” on Euromaid-
an student protesters. for most Ukrainians 
it served as a turning point in their struggle 
for Euro-integration, which became a fight for 
their constitutionally guaranteed rights of per-
sonal security and peaceful assemblies. 
 Crucially, before the November events 
Ukrainian society had actually reached a con-
sensus on the importance of Euro-integration. 
a characteristic detail is how even the Ukrai-
nian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarch-
ate voiced its support for Euro-integration 
together with other churches. the govern-
ment’s suspension of the signing of the asso-
ciation agreement with the EU was perceived 
by many Ukrainians as a threat of a reversal 
in its foreign policy direction. furthermore, 
the events at the Vilnius summit produced in 
the society a psychological feeling of the loss 
of the European perspective, which could 
transform Ukraine into a normal European 
country and ensure for everyone a decent and 
38Euxeinos 13 (2014)
andrij Ivanec‘
dignified life. For a large part of Ukrainians, 
the perspective of an EU integration embod-
ied their hope in overcoming the most acute 
Ukrainian problems, such as corruption, pov-
erty, dysfunctional state structures, and estab-
lishing new standards in social, economic and 
political life. 
as a result, there emerged a qualitatively 
new form of public protest - Euromaidan. Its 
principal difference from the Orange maidan 
is that opposition politicians today are not re-
garded as unconditional leaders and organis-
ers of the masses. Civil society tends to act on 
par with the political opposition and - with 
limited success - to form the opposition on its 
own. according to public opinion polls, the 
absolute majority of Euromaidan supporters 
joined the protests in Kiev not in response to 
the opposition’s calls. What was an uncondi-
tional loyalty to the opposition‘s presidential 
candidate in 2004 transformed ten years later, 
on Euromaidan 2014, into the civil society’s 
ambition to turn politicians into instruments 
of positive changes in the country. Charac-
teristically, the first rally to take place was 
the students’ Euromaidan, followed by the 
Euromaidan of the political opposition in Ki-
ev’s European Square. Later these two move-
ments merged on Independence Square. the 
merger, however, is not absolute. In spite of 
the opposition-initiated creation at the end of 
december of the all-Ukrainian Union “Maid-
an”, consisting of politicians and civil society 
representatives, Kiev’s Euromaidan includes 
more than twenty various civil groups and 
unions outside the opposition’s control. In 
fact, it is possible to speak of the ongoing ef-
fort of Euromaidan participants to establish 
between different civil society structures a 
symbiotic network model of relations and 
self-organisation, against the attempts of the 
political opposition to build and lead a verti-
cally constructed movement. Ukrainian 2014 
“Euro-revolution” has demonstrated its civil 
society’s coming of age and maturity; many 
segments of civil society and their ideas ap-
pear more productive for the country than the 
actions and ideas of the pro-government or 
even the opposition politicians. It is obvious, 
however, that Euromaidan’s heterogeneous 
civil society sector is too short of time to pro-
pose its own independent political project in 
the nearest future. Its activists mostly realise 
this and accept the need to work with existing 
politicians to achieve socially important goals. 
This is clearly a difficult task, requiring mu-
tual commitment from the civil society sector 
and the political establishment alike. 
But - as it has been already stated - Kiev’s 
Euromaidan is a phenomenon of national 
importance. and not only because among 
its activists there are representatives from all 
the country’s regions, including the Crimea 
and Sevastopol. (Significantly, Independence 
Square in November-december featured the 
flags of the Crimean Autonomous Republic 
and the Crimean tatars, while the hungry pro-
testers for many days on end could treat them-
selves to Crimean plov and other dishes of the 
Crimean tatar cooks). Euromaidan also has its 
counterparts, its supporters and opponents in 
Ukrainian regions.
Euromaidan in the Crimea: an active 
minority
Euromaidans beyond Kiev sprang up in 
November-december 2013 in practically all 
regional centres and in many smaller towns. 
They are, however, of different formats. A 
permanent Euromaidan in city centre, with a 
stage, exists only in Lviv; in some cities there 
are tent camps, while in others only regular 
activists’ meetings take place. the appearance 
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of a Euromaidan in the Crimea is an expect-
ed surprise. the Crimean peninsula consists 
of two territorial administrative units - the 
Crimean autonomous Republic and Sevasto-
pol. Both regions are traditional Party of Re-
gions (PR) and Viktor yanukovych’s electoral 
constituencies. Only donetsk and Lugansk re-
gions show a higher than in the Crimea level 
of electoral support for the pro-presidential 
forces. thus, for instance, in a 2012 parliamen-
tary election, in spite of a low turn-out, the 
Party of Regions received 52,3% and 46,9% of 
votes in the autonomous Republic and Sevas-
topol respectively; in the second round of the 
presidential election yanukovych got 78% of 
the Republic’s votes. Party of Regions mem-
bers enjoy a full control of the executive and 
legislative branches of power in the Republic; 
the Party of Regions’ outfit in the Autonomous 
Republic “the Regions of Crimea” holds 82 
out of 100 seats in the local parliament. the 
Party of Regions also controls the absolute ma-
jority of local administrations in the region, as 
well as governmental and local administrative 
bodies in Sevastopol. 
It did seem that under such circumstances 
there was no space for the pro-EU sentiment in 
the Crimea. the region, however, is by many 
tokens the most peculiar part of Ukraine; and 
the Crimean community is a multifaceted 
society. the autonomous Republic and Sev-
astopol are the only regions in the country 
where ethnic Ukrainians are not the biggest 
ethnic group, the majority of population com-
prised by representatives of ethnic minorities. 
Crimea is also an area, compactly inhabited 
by the Crimean tatar people. according to the 
2001 Ukrainian census, the population of the 
autonomous Republic of Crimea consisted 
of the following ethnic groups: 58,8 % - Rus-
sians, 24,6 % Ukrainians, and over slightly 12 
% - Crimean tatars. In Sevastopol, the relative 
number of ethnic Russians is higher than the 
general Crimean indicators.
Crimea’s ethnic composition explains its 
widespread pro-Russian sentiment, which in 
some residents of the autonomous Republic 
and Sevastopol has taken the form of Euro-
phobia. However, there is also a significant 
number of Crimeans who hold opposing 
views or support Ukraine’s integration into 
Europe and the Eurasian Union at the same 
time. thus, already in late November 2013 
Crimea saw public pro-EU protests in such 
towns as yevpatoria, feodosia, dzhankoy, 
and yalta. Later similar relatively sporadic ac-
tions took place in Kerch. Most systematic ac-
tions happened in Sevastopol and the capital 
of the autonomous Republic Simferopol. 
from late November to early January the 
residents of Simferopol witnessed almost daily 
events organised by Euro-activists. On week-
days those were activities of a few dozens of 
activists on the square outside the Republic’s 
government building. and on weekends a 
column of a few hundreds of people moved 
from the square to the Crimea’s parliament or 
the Representation of the President of Ukraine 
in the Republic of Crimea. a number of au-
to-caravans in support of Euromaidan drove 
along Crimean roads. Money, food, medicines 
and clothes were collected for the protesters in 
Kiev. first protests in the Crimea took place 
under the slogans in support of the president’s 
commitment to Euro-integration and with the 
demand to sign the association agreement 
in Vilnius. But after the events on November 
29th and 30th, the views of Crimean Euro-
activists became more radical - they rallied 
with the demands to name and bring to justice 
those responsible for the brutal crackdown 
on Maidan students, and called on the gov-
ernment and - later - the president to resign. 
as for Crimean printed and electronic 
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mass media, most of which are owned by 
the Party of Regions members or the state, 
in their representation of the events in Kiev 
they largely belied the standards of objective 
journalism. Many of them contributed to the 
anti-Maidan propaganda campaign. Some of 
the newspapers regularly presented the aver-
age Crimean reader with stories on the “Nazi 
coup” in Kiev, “Maidowns” (a nasty blend of 
the words “Maidan” and “down”), and de-
picting Euromaidan activists as hired stooges 
or loafers. this media propaganda campaign 
made Euromaidan supporters in Simferopol 
resort to such means of self-organisation as 
personal connections and facebook networks. 
at the end of November they elected coordi-
nators of the “Euromaidan-Crimea” move-
ment, including Serhii Kovalskiy, an activist 
of the Crimean section of Batkivshchyna, Ser-
hiy Mokrenyuk, head of the Crimean section 
of the non-parliamentary opposition party 
“democratic alliance”, an Udar activist Ismail 
Ismailov and leader of the “Crimean centre 
for business and cultural co-operation “Ukrai-
nian House” andriy Shchekun. although 
three of the four coordinators are party activ-
ists, they were not delegated to the movement 
“Euromaidan-Crimea” by their respective par-
ties. Moreover, in the words of Shchekun, the 
leaders of Crimean sections of parliamentary 
parties were primarily concerned with send-
ing Crimean volunteers to Kiev, rather than 
organising protest actions in the Republic. 
Shchekun, however, managed to convince 
young party and civil activists of the need to 
break through the information blockade and 
“show Ukraine and the world that there are 
people in the Crimea who want to live in a 
European society”. He is certain that they suc-
ceeded in achieving this goal. 
according to Shchekun, Crimean Euro-
activists experienced a lot of administrative 
pressure and open provocations. thus, for 
example, the authorities in Simferopol would 
deliberately stage mass counter-rallies at the 
same time and places with the Euromaidan 
events. they gathered employees of state 
enterprises to take part in the rallies and de-
ployed powerful sound equipment to silence 
the opponents. On december 12th 2013, car 
tires of the leader of “Udar” youth organisa-
tion in Sevastopol were slashed and the words 
“for Maidan” sprayed on the car. a similar in-
cident took place in Simferopol on december 
21st 2013: a “Euromaidan-Crimea” coordina-
tor Kovalskiy had his Mercedes damaged by 
unknown people, prompting a criminal inves-
tigation by the police. On december 3rd 2013, 
attackers set on fire the only Ukrainian Ortho-
dox Church of Kiev Patriarchate in yevpato-
ria, whose deacon father yaroslav Hontar had 
earlier left with a group of parishioners for Eu-
romaidan in Kiev. Crimean activists continue 
to report of other provocations and threats to 
them and their families. 
In view of such situation, it may be ar-
gued that regardless of its composition of 
civil society and political parties activists, the 
movement “Euromaidan-Crimea” is typo-
logically similar to Euromaidan’s civil sector 
in Kiev. On december 4th the Headquarters 
of national resistance in Crimea was formed, 
comprising representatives of eight political 
parties, 14 civil organisations and 11 activ-
ists of the “Euromaidan-Crimea” movement. 
Shchekun and Kovalskiy became coordinators 
of the Headquarters’ Council. In late decem-
ber 2013 a former head of the Republican for-
estry Committee Anatoliy Kovalskiy chaired 
the newly formed organisational committee of 
the all-Ukrainian Council “Maidan” in Sim-
feropol. anatoliy Kovalskiy became famous 
in 2004 when he refused to sign a permission 
to grant large plots of land from Crimea’s na-
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tional reserves fund to businesses, controlled 
by M. Kurochkin, a Russian businessman and 
facilitator between the Ukrainian and Rus-
sian governments during the 2004 presidential 
election. 
Presently, there are no readily available 
sociological data on general population sup-
port levels for Euro-integration in the Crimea. 
However, a poll conducted in december by the 
Crimean organisation of young political scien-
tists in Simferopol revealed that out of the 400 
respondents aged 18-35 60,5% supported the 
government’s decision to suspend the Euro-
integration process, 24% were against it, while 
15% remained undecided. In case of a refer-
endum, 36% of young people (Ukrainian law 
defines people under 35 years old as “young”) 
would vote for joining the Customs Union, 
and 33% - the EU. In other words, the number 
of young Simferopol residents who support 
the European or Eurasian vector of integration 
is relatively the same (the difference lies with-
in the margin of statistical error). It is quite an 
optimistic result for the pro-EU supporters, 
considering such factors as ethnic composition 
in the Republic and the hostile media environ-
ment. It is worth noting, however, that the lev-
el of pro-EU support is likely to drop among 
the Crimean residents of older generations.
Generally speaking, a sociological por-
trait of Crimean EU supporters resembles 
that of the whole Ukraine: although present 
in all social and age groups, they are pre-
dominantly young, running their own busi-
ness and Ukrainian-speaking. at least, those 
are the categories of citizens that take the 
most active part in the “Euromaidan-Crimea” 
events, together with political leaders and - 
to a lesser degree - teachers, journalists, state 
employees and pensioners. On the other 
hand, a significant presence of Crimean Ta-
tars among the supporters of local Euromaid-
ans can be seen as their distinctive feature. 
Crimean Tatars choose Europe 
the population of the autonomous Re-
public of Crimea includes 270 thousand 
Crimean tatars, or roughly 13% of general 
population. despite the apparently low pop-
ulation numbers of Crimean tatars, their na-
tional movement has played an important role 
in the Crimean and Ukrainian politics. this 
has become possible thanks to the national ex-
perience of self-organisation acquired during 
the long years of deportation and resistance 
against the communist regime, as well as the 
formation of national government institu-
tions, such as the general congress Kurultay 
or a system of executive bodies - Mejlis of the 
Crimean tatar people and local Mejlis bodies. 
One of the strong points of the national move-
ment is its extensive network of international 
links with Muslim and turkic structures and 
western donor organisations that provide 
support to repatriated Crimean tatars. 
In the past few years there has been a no-
table decline in support for local government 
and the Mejlis among the Crimean tatars. 
this is evident from the increased public ac-
tivities of the Mejlis political opponents and a 
growing approval among some segments of 
the Crimean Muslims of the idea of the cre-
ation of a worldwide caliphate as opposed to 
the idea of upholding the Crimean tatar na-
tional interests. In practice, however, the pres-
ent Kurultay-Mejlis system remains the most 
popular and influential in the Crimean Tatar 
community. The level of public influence ex-
erted by all Crimean tatar opponents of the 
current system taken together is nowhere near 
the capacity and leverage possibilities of the 
national government bodies. Moreover, last 
year a two-tier election system to the Kurul-
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tay was changed for direct elections, which 
increased the number of young delegates and 
made a positive consolidating impact on the 
Crimean tatar national movement. 
The Mejlis was among the first to an-
nounce its support for Euromaidan in Kiev 
and a European civilisational choice for 
Ukraine. In December the most influential 
Crimean tatar politician Mustafa dzhemilev, 
a Soviet-time dissident and a Byut MP, who 
for twenty-two years was head of the Mejlis, 
spoke in front of the pro-EU demonstrators 
in Kiev. the recently elected new head of the 
Mejlis, Refat Chubarov, joined the all-Ukrai-
nian Union “Maidan” Council. Head of the In-
ternational Section at the Mejlis ali Khamzin 
remarks that even those political and religious 
structures of the Crimean tatars that oppose 
the national government refrain from running 
a public campaign against the Euromaidan. 
they include the non-governmental organisa-
tion “Milliy firqa”, the Council of Represen-
tatives of the Crimean tatar People under the 
President of Ukraine and the presently illegal 
in Ukraine radical Muslim organisation Hizb 
ut-tahrir. 
the Mejlis’ choice in favour of Euro-inte-
gration - which probably reflects the general 
public mood among the Crimean tatars - can 
be explained by the ambition to pursue the 
nation’s strategic and tactical interests. the 
EU, from a Crimean tatar perspective, not 
only guarantees the general democratic devel-
opment of Ukraine, but also ensures a fairly 
high level of protection for national minori-
ties and indigenous peoples. Since the election 
of yanukovych as president in 2010 this has 
become an important item on the agenda of 
the Crimean tatar leaders, since both central 
and regional government bodies have been 
gradually limiting the scope of co-operation 
and dialogue with the national Crimean tatar 
institutions. the Composition of the Council 
of Representatives of the Crimean tatar Peo-
ple under the President of Ukraine, created 
under Leonid Kuchma as a step to legalise 
the Mejlis, has been changed to include other 
Crimean Tatar figures. In the past few years, 
this was not an actively-functioning body. Lo-
cal administrations in the Crimean regions, 
presided by donbass-born Party of Regions 
members, have been gradually trying to oust 
Mejlis representatives from power and replace 
them with more pro-government oriented 
Crimean tatars. the “Kurultay-Rukh” frac-
tion has lost its right to appoint head of the Re-
publican Committee for Interethnic Relations 
and deported Citizens at the Crimean Coun-
cil of Ministers. the Mejlis leaders complain 
about the disruption of the government’s 
Resettlement and Reintegration programme 
which last year received the record low 10 
million hryvnia from the national budget, in 
spite of the officially allocated 200 million. Ali 
Khamzin notes that the state has been unable 
so far to establish a systematic legal basis to 
ensure the rights protection and rehabilitation 
of the Crimean tatar people. 
there is, however, a certain number of 
Crimean tatars who politically support the 
Party of Regions and took part in Kiev’s anti-
maidan. they are mostly members of “Sebat”, 
a non-governmental organisation that unites 
participants in the land-grabbing movement. 
“Sebat”s representatives state that around 800 
of its members joined the antimaidan in Kiev. 
a Mejlis leader Khamzin believes that the 
number was no more than 20-30. 
The Eurasian Choice of the Autono-
mous Republic’s leadership and the Rus-
sian factor 
Since the beginning of the Euromaidan 
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protest movement, the Crimean authorities 
have taken a radically negative position. It did 
not come as a surprise when on November 
27th 2013 the majority of MPs in the Crimean 
parliament voted in favour of the Ukrainian 
government’s decision to suspend the sign-
ing of an association agreement with the EU 
in the name of the national security interests, 
and condemned the “destructive actions” of 
“Svoboda”, “Batkivshchyna” and “Udar” par-
ties. In an appeal to the president, approved 
by the extraordinary parliamentary session on 
december 2nd 2013, Crimean MPs not only 
harshly criticised their political opponents but 
also called on the central government to take 
radical measures. the style of the document 
is evident from a characteristic quote (origi-
nally in Russian): “the government is obliged 
to prevent an unconstitutional revanche on 
the part of the bankrupt political forces that 
profess radical nationalism and have already 
crossed the line separating it from Nazism”. It 
is of interest to note that the document goes as 
far as actually labelling the government’s op-
ponents as “nazis”. More crucially, however, 
the Crimean parliament calls on the president 
to “stop the spread of lawlessness and anar-
chy on the capital’s street”, to urgently put an 
end to the activities of the destructive forces 
including by introduction - if necessary - of 
the emergency state. the same parliamentary 
session heard the parliament’s vice-speaker 
Hryhoriy Ioffe declare cynically: “for the 
events on Maidan in Kiev, for everything that 
took place there on November 29th and 30th 
and is going on now, those who organise such 
“maidans”should be held responsible”. as 
such, he actually justified the excessive use of 
force against peaceful protesters by anti-riot 
police. 
another landmark decision of the Crime-
an parliament came on december 3rd 2013, 
when it approved a proposal to the president 
and government of Ukraine to “consider in the 
short term the possibility of Ukraine’s joining 
the Customs Union”. In other words, Crimean 
Party of Regions members proposed to their 
senior party cronies in governmental chairs to 
officially change the country’s foreign policy. 
for Ukraine’s commitment to Euro-integra-
tion has been enshrined in laws and its lead-
ers continue to declare that the EU-association 
process has been only suspended. 
It is clear that a difficult economic situa-
tion in the country and the political crisis have 
caused the autonomous Republic’s establish-
ment to fear for its future, advocating the use 
of force and unleashing a media war against 
Euromaidan supporters. furthermore, central 
authorities could use their Crimean allies’ po-
sition as an instrument in the general political 
balance of power in the country. at the same 
time, the Crimean leadership’s decisions and 
proposals, as well as those in some other re-
gions of South Eastern Ukraine, can be also 
seen as a symmetrical response to measures 
in support of the Euromaidan movement, de-
clared and adopted by local government bod-
ies in Western Ukraine.
Until mid-december the pro-government 
authorities in the Crimea sought to mobilise 
the population in support of the central gov-
ernment by unleashing a full-fledged media 
war. Some of the propaganda content was 
borderline - to say the least - in the context of 
Crimea’s multiethnic community and with 
regard to Ukraine’s national interests. the 
most controversial came from the Presidium 
of the Crimean parliament who on december 
12th 2013 published an appeal to the people 
of Crimea. the document described the threat 
to the Republic’s autonomous status from the 
“organisers of mass street protests in Kiev” 
and warned that the Crimeans would be “de-
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prived of their right to speak, write or be edu-
cated in Russian, the native language for the 
majority of Crimean residents”. the appeal 
also declared that the “autonomous Republic 
is in danger!”; “the fate of the whole Ukraine 
and the Crimean autonomous Republic is be-
ing decided today” and that the “Crimea is fac-
ing a choice: to put up with the forced Maidan-
isation, or to stand up decisively against the 
anti-government and anti-Crimean forces”. 
It is hardly necessary to argue here that 
Kiev’s Euromaidan did not voice a single de-
mand to cancel Crimea’s autonomous status or 
to ban the use of the Russian language in the 
peninsula. those are not programmatic items 
for the majority of Euromaidan groups (with 
the only exception of Svoboda’s position on 
the autonomous status which was not in any 
case raised during the Euromaidan events). 
Moreover, if anything the EU integration en-
sures additional guarantees for the protection 
of linguistic and cultural rights of national mi-
norities. What was the motive then behind the 
Crimean parliament leadership’s deliberate 
demonisation of Euromaidan?
Some commentators have suggested that 
this was more than a simple manifestation 
of low political culture or a method used to 
consolidate the pro-government forces in the 
Crimea in a complex economic and political 
situation. a more sinister implication was per-
ceived in similar public messages: “Nobody in 
Kiev should wrongly assume that the Crimea 
will tolerate the enforcement of some else’s 
will”; as well as in the initiative of the PR dep-
uty in Sevastopol Serhiy Smol’ianinov to col-
lect signatures under an appeal to the Russian 
president to deploy Russian troops in Ukraine 
to “counterbalance the army of the United 
States of america and their NatO aggres-
sors”. there has been a steady increase in the 
number of articles in local printed media on 
the breakup of Ukraine, the collapse of Ukrai-
nian statehood, and the need for a federal ar-
rangement, accompanied - sometimes - by not 
so subtle separatist slogans. 
Opposition politicians began to voice their 
concern over the threat of the Crimean separat-
ism and the Russian factor. an ex-member of 
the Ukrainian parliament and the Mejlis head 
Chubarov remarked last december that for 
him the threat of the Crimea’s secession had 
never been more tangible. On december 14th 
2013, a Svoboda MP and a member of the par-
liamentary committee on the national security 
and defence yuriy Syrotyuk reported on the 
plans for a Russian-backed special operation 
to declare the Crimea’s state sovereignty from 
Ukraine. according to Syrotyuk, a meeting 
between PR members of the Crimean parlia-
ment, leader of the party “Russian bloc” and 
representatives of the party “Russian unity” 
had taken place in the Russian consulate in 
Simferopol. allegedly, the secessionist scenar-
io was supposed to be launched publicly with 
a demand from the Crimean antimaidan sup-
porters for a referendum on the Crimea’s state 
sovereignty. “this scenario is a contingency 
plan in that case if yanukovych loses control 
in Kiev and the majority in Verkhovna Rada” 
- said the MP. 
Politicians from the above-named pro-
Russian parties do not confirm the existence 
of separatist plans. More in general, it is very 
difficult to make a proper assessment of Rus-
sia’s Crimean intentions and Ukrainian action 
plans, which largely remain hidden from the 
public eye. It is obvious, however, that Rus-
sia closely watches the situation in the Crimea, 
hoping to use it as a leverage of influence in 
Ukraine as a whole. the separatist card can be 
only played in the exceptional circumstances. 
Even more so after the signing by the Rus-
sian and Ukrainian presidents on december 
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17th 2013 of a deal concerned with a money 
credit and gas-price reduction, which greatly 
reduced the risk of any possible separatist 
scenario in the Crimea by the external forces. 
Besides, the agreement has resulted in a rela-
tive stabilisation of the presidential power and 
the economic situation in the country which is 
likely to ease the Crimean political establish-
ment’s fears of what they see as the realisation 
of the worst-case scenario. 
and yet, the ongoing political crisis urges 
the pro-government forces in the Crimea to 
keep the political situation under control and 
consolidate the population’s support. One of 
the methods they continue to use is the delib-
erate escalation of artificial threats. Thus, dur-
ing a press conference in Simferopol after their 
return from the pro-government antimaidan 
rallies in Kiev, the activists of the Crimean ta-
tar organisation “Sebat” declared that some-
when in the first half of 2014 the USA intended 
to use the Mejlis of the Crimean tatar people 
as a platform for provocations in the Repub-
lic. Since the anti-tatar sentiment remains 
a lingering factor among some segments of 
the post-Soviet Crimean society, even a hy-
pothetical threat of provocations may push a 
certain part of Crimeans to show greater sup-
port for the authorities as the only stabilising 
force. Mejlis’ head of the international section 
Khamzin characterises the “Sebat” claims as 
untruthful and immoral. In his opinion, it is 
a long-shot attempt to create in the Crimean 
society a negative image of the future activities 
in support of the Crimean tatars’ rights, en-
visaged by the national government bodies as 
part of the commemorations for the 70th anni-
versary of Stalin’s criminal deportation of the 
Crimean tatar people from the Crimea. 
What next? A no-reply question
It is too early to make any conclusions 
about Euromaidan’s results. It is obvious, on 
the one hand, that Ukraine’s authorities man-
aged to steer through a dangerous geo-politi-
cal curve and even to achieve a relative social 
and economic stabilisation in the country. On 
the other, the Euromaidan movement in Kiev 
and other regions has received a worldwide 
moral support and continues to exist, albeit 
without the real resources for a radical change 
of the political situation. the best-case sce-
nario for the development of the situation in 
the country would require reaching a set of 
compromises between the government, the 
opposition and the society aimed at reform-
ing the country and implementing the Euro-
integration policy. this looks like a daunting 
task, but is not impossible. as for the Crimean 
Euromaidan supporters, their fate and the sit-
uation in the Crimea in general will depend 
on future developments in the country and on 
geo-political games around Ukraine....
translated by  Vladyslava Reznyk
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If I were staying in Kyiv now, I would not write this – I would be busy on Maidan. 
However, I am physically too distanced from 
the events. and this very fact has made me 
even more emotionally involved. the feeling 
of despair has forced me to track the online 
streams and to check the headlines. I have had 
enough time to review all major world media 
including Russian media. there are no sur-
prises from the Russians – they call me and my 
friends the “aggressive crowd”, our Ukrainian 
and European identity “radical”, and our ef-
forts to protect our dignity and rights a “riot”. 
However, it was sad to observe rather 
such superficial analysis even from the promi-
nent global media. for example, on one of the 
tV channel the analyst asked the reporter, 
who streamed from Kyiv barricades, what is 
the difference in percentage of population sup-
porting Maidan and yanukovych. the report-
er admitted that he did not know, but that the 
country is divided and that Eastern Ukraine is 
Russian. Such an approach to the analysis of 
the situation in Ukraine is not only distanced 
from the reality, but also reflects ideas care-
fully invented and implemented by Kremlin. 
first of all, for those who like statistics: let 
us see whether the linguistic and nationality 
issues in Ukraine have any impact on the situ-
ation. Even though 60% of Ukrainians claim 
Ukrainian as their mother tongue, it is true 
that a majority of the population is bilingual 
– they can communicate in both Ukrainian 
and Russian. But you would not claim Swedes 
to be British just because 95% of the Swedish 
population is fluent in English. Neither me nor 
my parents could choose a second language 
for us as school students (and for some even 
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the first language). I had to study the Russian 
language, Russian literature and watch Soviet 
tV in Russian. therefore, it is not my fault 
that I can speak Russian. Regarding nationali-
ties: 17% of the inhabitants of Ukraine identify 
themselves as Russians. Crimea is the only ter-
ritory where there more than 50% Russians, 
while seven of 24 regions have more than 10% 
of Russians, and there are 13.1% native Rus-
sians in Kyiv.
to judge whether the linguistic or nation-
ality issues have anything to do with current 
protests I would suggest considering the fol-
lowing. the majority of the Kyiv population, 
especially young people, prefers Russian as 
their language of communication and most 
of the young residents of the Ukrainian capi-
tal are on the barricades today. the language 
spoken out on the Maidan stage does not mat-
ter. the nationality is never asked about and 
cannot be seen under the protestors’ masks. 
finally, the list of those killed is the essential 
proof that there is no correlation between na-
tional or linguistic identity and the current 
protests. 
However, the data are logical if you con-
sider them from the perspective of Russian 
history and the eternal Russian political in-
terest in Ukraine. Russia needs Ukraine not 
only as a market, a military base, or as a gas 
pipe. It needs Ukraine (but only as a territory) 
to prove its legitimacy as a “great nation” de-
riving from the Kyevan Rus, an Eastern Euro-
pean Slavic state in 9th-13 century. Otherwise, 
it would have to begin writing its history only 
after the Moscow Kingdom founded in 14th 
century. this state was in fact was not inde-
pendent, rather a vassal of the Golden Horde, 
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a Mongol state. It means that Russia would 
not only need to redesign the exposition in the 
History Museum on Red Square and to change 
all the textbooks for schools and universities. 
It would also have to stop calling itself the 
“Slavic nation” with the status of “older broth-
er” and the legitimacy to patronize “younger 
sisters” like Ukraine, Belarus and whoever 
was “adopted”. 
this is why Peter the Great in his dreams 
of Europe, as well as his successors, were so 
desperate to invade Ukraine and ravish its Or-
thodox Church Metropolis. this is why Stalin 
killed millions of Ukrainians though famine in 
1932-33 and ordered in 1939 to rewrite history 
and replace the term “Kyevan Rus” with the 
term “Old Russian State”. this is why Putin 
said to Bush at a NatO meeting in Bucharest 
in 2008: “you don’t understand, George, that 
Ukraine is not even a state. What is Ukraine? 
Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, but 
the greater part is a gift from us.” during 
his “reign” Putin put his efforts into proving 
both to the world and to the Ukrainians that 
Ukraine does not deserve a place on the map 
of Europe but only on the map of Russian me-
tropolis. 
as much as the Russian leader is desper-
ate to devour Ukraine, the Ukrainian people 
are equally desperate to dissociate themselves 
from Russia. Perhaps the inherent feeling of 
dignity or historical memory of democracy 
fostered by the 20 years of freedom led, espe-
cially in the younger generation, to disgust and 
the rejection of the arrogance and superficial-
ity traditionally exerted by Russians whether 
in the private or public treatment of anything 
Ukrainian. 
It is now generally known that the Maid-
an protests started as a reaction to the decision 
of the Ukrainian Government to “suspend” 
the process of signing an association agree-
ment with the EU in favor of closer coopera-
tion with Russia. the data as of January show 
that if the referendum on the association with 
the EU were held today, 47% of Ukrainians 
would say “yes”. at the same time 34% would 
say “yes”, if a referendum were held on join-
ing the customs union with Russia. In addi-
tion the same research shows that Maidan has 
48% supporters (27% who fully support it) 
and 46% opponents (31% who fully reject it). 
Looking at the data, one would be inclined to 
argue that the country is split. However, one 
could respond: have you ever heard of any 
public support in Ukraine for accession to a 
customs union? Me neither -because the pro-
test is not about the union, whether European 
or a customs union. It is all about the values 
as well as the will and ability to protect them. 
those who support Maidan support EU in-
tegration because the Maidan and EU values 
apparently coincide. People on Maidan share 
common values of human dignity, respect to 
human rights and accountable government. 
But even more they share trust, solidarity, and 
personal accountability. that is why they are 
standing outside for three months, suffer the-
25 degree frost, severe injuries and are even 
dying just to protect these values. 
Most probably, those who fully reject 
Maidan are the same who would say “yes” 
to the union with Russia. then another ques-
tion is how much do they know about the 
real Maidan as well as the real Russia? Is their 
awareness and belief in Russian values strong 
enough to consistently articulate and defend 
them, not to mention die for them? they can 
reject Maidan but they would never have 
enough arguments to oppose it. you can see 
no supporters of the custom union accession 
on the other side of the barricades. the other 
side of the barricade consists of brutal police 
supported by paid criminal gangs called “ti-
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tushki” and since february 20th even released 
prisoners. It would not be declamatory to say 
that it is a fight between “good” and “evil”. 
and yes the country is divided into those who 
are ready to support the “good” and those 
who in fact do not care. therefore the people 
in this country are just normally socially strati-
fied – some of them are politically active and 
motivated and others are not. the only prob-
lem is that the will of those who do care com-
pletely contradicts the strategic interests of the 
leader of the neighboring state.
Putin has very diligently approached his 
goal. He has been very diligent in arranging 
this for many years. He already has made sev-
eral “grabs” at Ukraine, in particular in 2000 
and in 2004. But former President Kuchma was 
too independent, careful and smart enough 
not to be embraced by the “older brother”. ya-
nukovych appeared to be the ideal instrument 
for manipulation: greedy, almost entirely un-
educated, with law self-esteem. 
the Kremlin developed the concept of 
“Russian-speaking population” to justify its 
interference into the internal policies of its 
neighboring states. “Russian interests go as 
far as Russian speech is heard” – this is one 
of the key formulas of Russian international 
policy. This formula was developed specifi-
cally for invasion purposes and is strategically 
implemented as follows. the Kremlin claims 
that part of the territory of a given state is 
Russian-speaking. – the “Russian-speaking 
population” has specific “rights” that cannot 
be properly protected in the unitary state, 
which is why the state should introduce fed-
eralist structures (this part can be skipped). 
– the “Russian-speaking population” is sud-
denly threatened by “other-language-speak-
ing population”. – Obliged to protect any 
“Russian-speaker”, the Kremlin uses tanks 
and missiles to enter the territory of anoth-
er state to fulfil its “mission of protection”. 
this strategy has been already employed 
in Moldova in the 1990s as well as in 2008 to 
invade part of the territory of Georgia. for 
decades the same formula is has been ef-
fectively exploited in Ukraine, in particular, 
with regard to Crimea and Eastern regions 
of Ukraine. the actions that complement this 
strategy are permanent claims of the Kremlin 
and its emissary in Ukrainian (and not only) 
politics: that “Russian-speaking population” 
in Ukraine has some specific rights and that 
is why the country is divided into Russian-
speaking East and Ukrainian-speaking West; 
that Western Ukrainians are nationalists and 
radicals; that EU integration and therefore all 
protest activity are supported only by West-
ern Ukrainians (nationalists and radicals). the 
Russian lobby in the Ukrainian Parliament 
has already suggested changing Ukraine into 
a federal state. and the leadership of Crimea 
has already claimed that they do not feel safe 
as a part of Ukraine and want to join Russia. It 
had to be the elected President of Ukraine and 
not US Senator McCain to reply that “… all na-
tions must support the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine, including Crimea”. On the opposite, 
by repeating the mantra that those on Maidan 
are radicals and represent only small part of 
the country, yanukovych is making a strong 
contribution to the Kremlin’s efforts to open 
the gates for a Russian invasion of Ukraine. 
Another concept developed specifically 
for Ukraine and Byelorus is the concept of 
“single nation”. according to Putin there is 
no Ukrainian nation, just “Little Russia”. This 
concept is strongly supported by the Russian 
Orthodox Church and its “doctrine” of the 
“Russian world”. the core strategy accord-
ing to this concept is the following. Ukraini-
ans are not a separate nation but a “branch” 
of the larger Russian nation. Since Ukrainians 
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and Russians are identical only Russia can un-
derstand what is going on in “poor Ukraine’s” 
head. – Europe has to allow Russia to take 
“care of Ukraine” and to protect Europe from 
possible “Ukrainian threats”. the implemen-
tation of this concept can be seen in the justifi-
cations that the President and the Government 
of Ukraine provided upon the abrupt decision 
to suspend the association with the EU. they 
said that we had to cooperate closely with 
Russia since we were two “brother nations”, 
used “to grow up together”, shared the same 
values and Russia could understand us better 
that the EU. the same concept was used by the 
President of Ukraine to call the extortionate 
Russian loan a “ brotherly help”. 
Putin has taken care of everything, even 
Maidan. Of course he would be happy to ac-
quire Ukraine on voluntary basis. However, 
the protests started and he adapted them to 
his strategy. Kremlin’s emissary in the Presi-
dential administration and in the Ukrainian 
Government made it possible. the brutal vio-
lence of police is absolutely illogical for yanu-
kovych as he will never benefit from it. But it 
is very beneficial to Putin. The “bloody” Ya-
nukovych made him “unacceptable” for the 
West, meaning that he either has to resign or 
to be abandoned by the civilized world. Putin 
is well aware how difficult it will be for Yanu-
kovych to resign and the isolation is the best 
reason for Kremlin “to take care of Ukraine”. 
the recent statement of angela Merkel that 
she agreed with Putin on the joint measures 
against Ukraine proves 
that Putin’s strategy 
is advancing. all the 
agreements between 
Germany and Russia, 
including those in 1918 
and in 1939 only had 
negative consequences 
for Ukraine. But – no 
pity. It just shows that 
Europe, at least its key 
players, do not under-
stand and therefore do 
not deserve Maidan.
Not understanding 
Maidan is a problem 
for Europe and serious 
mistake in Putin’s equa-
tion. Maidain is not 
one square that can be 
smashed and cleaned up. Maidan is not about 
supporting any party or opposition leaders – 
it will deal with which parties and leaders to 
support when the elections come. . Maidan 
is 27% of Ukrainians ready to fight for their 
dignity and 21% who are willing to i to sup-
port this fight. Yanukovych had to implement 
de facto astate of emergency, in order to block 
Kyiv, close the subway, put armed police at 
check points on every downtown cross-road 
Oksana Syroyid
Kyiv 2013 © Pavlo Ostrovs‘kyj 
50Euxeinos 13 (2014)
and on the main roads to the city just to pre-
vent these 27% from arriving at their focal 
point of their struggle. However, it demon-
strates that he knows nothing about the people 
he appeared to be the President of.
for those who never have been on Maidan 
I can report that the barricaded territory un-
til recently had its own medical service with a 
fully equipped hospital and a number of medi-
cal checkpoints, accommodations and perma-
nent meal services for thousands,a library, two 
street universities, an It center, art centers, 
permanent hotlines, etc. It was self-sustaining 
and self-organized. How did it work? I know a 
doctor, who has been volunteering in the med-
ical service from the very first days. I know 
a retired prosperous businessman, who has 
been going to Maidan every day supplying 
protestors with gas and firewood for heating. I 
know dozens of people, students, top manag-
ers, analysts, NGO representatives, business-
men, artists, and public servants who have 
been going there everyday and taking efforts 
to maintain the Maidan. they cut sandwiches 
and built barricades, monitored court trials 
and protected injured in the hospitals from 
the police, delivered grocery and taught in the 
street universities, coordinated call centers and 
purchased and installed medical equipment. 
and, most importantly, they kept Maidan safe 
and clean. 
the violence that started on february 18 
turned Maidan into one of the most danger-
ous and apocalyptic places in the world. How-
ever, the ensuing violence only increased the 
significance of Maidan for Ukrainians. Despite 
hundreds killed and thousands injured, peo-
ple are not leaving Maidan – they are just ar-
riving with the necessities – food, medicines, 
tires, equipment. and all of them are bringing 
their courage, mutual trust and belief in their 
values. When was the last time that Europe has 
experienced something like this?
Finally, to explain the difference in the 
level of support for Maidan and for yanu-
kovych I suggest one illustration. after the 
terror of february 18th the medical service 
announced around 9 in the morning next day 
that the blood donors were needed. the trans-
port system was blocked and there was only 
one donor station in the city. By the noon the 
emergency call center reported that the line of 
donors consisted of more than 100 people. In 
a few hours the medical service reported that 
they have collected enough blood and asked 
people to keep it for other situations of need. 
Unfortunately, the next situation of need was 
next day and the situation repeated. How 
many people do you think would stay in line 
to give their blood for yanukovych? 
P.S. On february 20th around one hun-
dred people were shot dead by snipers. doc-
tors and volunteers were singing the Ukrainian 
anthem when the bodies of twelve protestors 
were taken from the improvised hospital in 
the hotel lobby… Even after resignation yanu-
kovych has to be prosecuted and deprived of 
his lifelong presidential status – he cannot die 
as a President and have the Ukrainian anthem 
sung in his honor.
P.P.S. from the moment I have started to 
write it until the moment I finished, just two 
days have passed. the situation is changing 
every hour. a solution has not yet been found. 
I always knew that Putin never gives up. But I 
also know that Maidan will always win.
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a peaceful, civil society protest on the 
Maidan Square of Kiev has turned into a 
violent change of government, which has 
escalated into an international crisis in 
view of the Russian military actions on the 
Crimean Peninsula since late february. 
the following chronology summarizes the 
most important events, in order to shed light 
on the process of confrontation radicalization 
and escalation. Six broader phases can be iden-
tified up to now (last update: 8 March 2014).
the chronology makes no claim to be com-
plete. 
First phase – November 21st, 2013 - 29th, 2013: 
Failure to sign the association agreement 
with the EU before the EU-Vilnius summit
Peaceful pro-European student protests
On November 21st, 2013, the Ukrainian 
government declares that it will not sign the 
EU-association agreement. due to this politi-
cal shift, the Euromaidan is created November 
24th, 2013 as a peaceful protest against yanu-
kovych. In several cities the protests are linked 
with the national day of commemoration of 
the Holodomor. Euromaidan is from the very 
beginning a dynamic phenomenon, a living 
organism that constantly grows and develops 
ideas as its aims. after the refusal to sign the 
treaty with the EU at the EU Summit in Vilnius 
(November 28th-29th 2013) and the obvious 
Russian interest and interference in that pro-
cess, the protests on Maidans (public squares) 
in Kyiv and other cities begin to grow. 
Second Phase – November 29th, 2013 & De-
cember 2013: Police violence against peaceful 
protesters
Mass mobilization in Kyiv and demands for 
political changes in Ukraine
during the night from November 29th 
to 30th the special force Berkut brutally at-
tacks and seriously injures many of the peace-
ful protestors, while pretending to put up 
a Christmas tree on the Maidan, the center 
of the non-violent protests. as a result the 
Maidan is dismantled. that is the prelude to 
the second wave of Maidan protests: the pro-
test against violence and the ignoring of law 
and order by the yanukovych administration. 
On december 1st, 2013 a mass demonstration 
takes place in Kyiv, first on the square in front 
of St. Michael‘s monastery, as the Maidan 
was ”closed“. Later that day protesters again 
gain space on Maidan where the protest camp 
had been set up for many weeks. Besides the 
House of Unions and the City Hall, protest-
ers occupy other buildings and use them as a 
cafeteria, meeting place and for organization-
al purposes. the political opposition – Udar, 
Svoboda and Batkyvshina – now attempt to 
manage the protests with various degrees of 
acceptance. there are many slogans demand-
ing new elections of the parliament and the 
president.
from then on, people gather for mass 
demonstrations every Sunday. On december 
8th, 2013 the Lenin monument near Bezarab-
sky Rynok in the centre of Kyiv is smashed 
by protesters. this is the beginning of “Len-
infalls“ in many Ukrainian cities and towns.
during december, repressions by govern-
ment forces and state institutions such as tri-
als and street hooligans hired by the Party of 
Regions increased. Violence increased against 
certain groups of persons such as journalists 
and Maidan activists, e.g. the beating of tatja-
na Chornovol and Juri Lutsenko. In violation 
of existing laws, judges allow for people to be 
kept in custody without official charges. These 
are partly intentional provocations by the gov-
ernment to stir up the conflict and to end the 
EuroMaidan. Chronology of Events
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protests not with political negotiations, rather 
with fierce state violence, This is essentially 
the strategy of yanukovych against Maidan in 
the following weeks.
Third Phase – January 2014: 
Actions and Reactions: Misinterpretations of 
the Government
during January 2014, Euromaidan chang-
es its character once again: the peaceful pro-
tests grow more and more into an uprising, 
while the protesters became more radical. 
to a great deal this radicalization is a result 
of the steady provocation by the yanukovych 
administration. the persecution of protesters, 
esp. of the participants of the so called auto-
maidan, expanded. there are cases of severe 
torture and several casualties (Viktor Bolotov, 
Ihor Lutsenko). doctors and medical personal 
receive advice to report to the police the per-
sonal data of injured protesters, and cases of 
arrests of protesters in medical facilities are re-
ported. In violation of the law, water cannons 
during minus 20° C temperatures are used 
against protesters and the security forces ap-
ply further forbidden measures.
On January 16th, 2014 a series of laws 
are passed by parliament, which violate 
fundamental human rights and freedoms 
and thus pave the way towards a dictator-
ship (such as in Belarus). It causes a reso-
lute reaction by the Maidan protesters, 
and the yanukovych administration re-
sponded with another wave of state terror. 
Yanukovych attempts to stop the restless 
protests with new laws. He wishes to restore 
law and order, instead of finding a compromise.
In the following days violence escalates, 
esp. in Hrushevskyj Street and first deaths 
occur as a result of sniper fire. Clashes with 
special police forces and protesters steadily 
increase, and there are intentional attacks on 
journalists, medical personal, while existing 
laws are continuously broken during trials 
and by judges. the protesters occupy local 
and state government buildings and institu-
tions, continue to block roads and to prevent 
police forces from leaving their barracks. Pro-
testers in other cities, esp. in western Ukraine 
occupy or block the regional government rep-
resentation and the offices of the Party of Re-
gions (yanukovych’s party). 
the administration does not stop the con-
frontations in the streets, rather start talks and 
negotiations to cancel the laws of January 16th 
and to declare amnesty for arrested protest-
ers. these concessions of the government are 
linked to preconditions such as the end of all 
protests and clearing all government and local 
government buildings. there seem to be dif-
ferent fractions and attitudes towards further 
proceedings in the government. at the same 
time the Ukrainian government is very close 
to bankruptcy and needs financial help.
Both the EU and Russia declare their non-
interference into internal Ukrainian issues, 
but the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lav-
rov complains that the US and the EU are al-
ready interfering.
Fourth Phase February 18th - 21st, 2014:
Escalation of violence, more than 80 people 
killed
Both protesters on Maidan and the opposition 
in parliament unsuccessfully demand the res-
titution of the 2004 constitution. In the mean-
time the situation escalates on the streets and 
snipers repeatedly shoot at protesters. the 
government tries to clear Maidan and the oc-
cupied buildings and discusses an upcoming 
declaration of a state of emergency. this way, 
the army could be used for domestic purpos-
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es. Streets and railways to Western Ukraine 
are interrupted by police. the “Right Sector” 
calls to arms and for militant self-defense 
against the police and Berkut. Political nego-
tiations prove to be useless, while combat be-
tween self-defense troops on Maidan and Ber-
kut become fierce. Maidan is still in the hands 
of the protesters though. More than 80 people 
are killed, most of them by snipers. the people 
in Ukraine are in shock and the scene is remi-
niscent of war. 
Fifth Phase February 22nd, 2014:
Peace negotiations and change in govern-
ment 
three EU foreign ministers from Germa-
ny (Steinmeier), Poland (Sikorski) and france 
(fabius) come to Kyiv for negotiations. Russia 
sends an emissary as well (Lukin). they talk to 
yanukovych and the three opposition leaders. 
On february 22nd, 2014 they present to the 
public a peace agreement1. yanukovych ac-
cepts new presidential elections for 2014 and 
the restitution of the 2004 constitution. the 
Ukrainian parliament votes with a brought 
majority for the restitution of the 2004 consti-
tution.
dmitry Jarosh as speaker for the Right 
Sector and the auto-Maidan do not accept the 
peace agreement and demand the resignation 
of yanukovych in the next 24 hours. 
due to personal changes in the govern-
ment and the new political directions in 
parliament yanukovych leaves Kyiv dur-
ing the night for eastern Ukraine. On feb-
ruary 22nd, yulia timoshenko is freed 
from prison and travels directly to the 
Maidan in Kyiv to call on the masses to not 
1 http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/
contentblob/671350/publicationfile/190045/140221-
UKR_Erklaerung.pdf
stop protesting until yanukovych resigns.
from Rostov/don yanukovych declares 
on february 28th, in a video to the public 
that he views the political changes as a coup 
d’état and still regards himself as the legiti-
mate president of Ukraine. Russia’s president 
Putin backs him esp. in connection with the 
beginning occupation of Crimea at that time. 
With 317 of 331 votes, the parliament declares 
Victor Yanukovych to be removed from office 
and plans new elections for May 25th, 2014. It 
also appoints acting directors of the domestic 
secret service general public prosecution of-
fice, an interim president, head of government 
as well as ministers of internal and foreign af-
fairs. Investigations into the 101 deaths which 
occurred during the conflicts on the Maidan 
are initiated. the deceased are now called the 
“Heavenly Hundred“.
As part of several legal modifications and 
personnel-related decisions, the disputed lan-
guage law of 2012 is withdrawn, which pro-
vides for that the language spoken by at least 
10 % of the population is recognized as an of-
ficial language. This decision is again reversed 
several days later, because it is understood as 
a provocation against the Russian population.2 
anti-Maidan demonstrations take place 
on the Crimean Peninsula (Kerch, Sevastopol) 
and in Odessa. 
the departure of yanukovych after the 
negotiations with the EU troika and the oppo-
sition parties came by surprise to many Ukrai-
nians and international observers. His escape 
from Ukraine marks the end of the Maidan 
demonstrations and at the same time sheds 
2  Moser, Michael: Language Policy and 
discourse on Languages in Ukraine under President 
Viktor Yanukovych. Ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart 2013; 
Kulyk, Volodymyr: Language Policy in Ukraine
What People Want the State to do. In: East European 
Politics and Societies 27 (2013) no. 2, 280-307
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light on other hot spots, most notably the 
involvement in and occupation of Crimea 
by Russia as of late february. the events in 
Crimea and eastern and south eastern cities 
of Ukraine are closely linked with the Maid-
an movement and the development of a civil 
society in Ukraine. However, it is a different 
kind of struggle with the unmistakeable in-
volvement of international power interests. 
the focus now shifts from domestic Ukrai-
nian affairs and events to constellations re-
calling cold-war scenarios.
Sixth Phase February 28th, 2014 - :
The Crimean Crisis
On february 20th, 2014 the speaker of 
the parliament of the autonomous Republic 
of Crimea, Volodymyr Konstantinov (Party 
of Regions) does not rule out that the Crime-
an Peninsula will separate from Ukraine. On 
February 27th, a Russian flag is hoisted on 
the parliament building of Crimea. the re-
gional parliament and several airports are 
occupied by men in uniforms without na-
tionality markings. Russia increases its mili-
tary presence on the Crimean Peninsula. On 
the same day, the parliament decides to hold 
a referendum on the national affiliation of 
Crimea on March 16th, 2014. 
compiled by alexander Kratochvil & Carmen 
Scheide
translated by  Michael Dobbins
Some interesting links:
General information and documents:
http://www.ssees.ucl.ac.uk/library/directory/
ukraine2014.htm
Chronology of events (in German):
http://www.laender-analysen.de/index.
php?topic=ukraine&url=../ukraine/archiv.
html
the Ukraine List by dominique arel:
http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/
orange.html
Chronology
according to the ballot paper voters in Crimea are given 
the choice to join Russia immediatly or to return to the 
Constitution of 1992 within Ukraine. a third option is not 
possible. 
Source: www.bbc.com
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